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Rich Offender, Poor Offender: Why It
(Sometimes) Matters in Sentencing
Mirko Bagaric
I. Introduction
The problem of economically and socially disadvantaged
offenders is one of the most perplexing issues in sentencing. It is a
worldwide phenomenon that people from disadvantaged
backgrounds are convicted of more crimes and sentenced to
imprisonment than other people.1 It has been suggested that this
often occurs for reasons that are not within the control of
disadvantaged offenders.2 The potentially unfair manner in which
the criminal justice system operates against offenders from
deprived backgrounds, and their over-representation in the
criminal justice system, has proven to be a complex problem,
devoid of a clear solution. It has even led to some of the most
eminent commentators on punishment to retract or re-think their
theories of punishment.3
Herbert L.A. Hart suggests that, although there should not
be a general defense of economic temptation, for "those who are
below the minimum level of economic prosperity ... [perhaps] we
should incorporate as a further excusing condition, the pressure of
gross forms of economic necessity."4 This concept was influentially
developed by Richard Delgado nearly forty years ago and was
touted as the "rotten social background defense."'
t Professor and Dean of Law at Deakin University Law School, Melbourne,
Australia.
1. See infra Part II; see also STEVEN Box, RECESSION, CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT 96 (1987) (concluding that income inequality is strongly related to
criminal activity).
2. See, e.g., Michele Estrin Gilman, The Poverty Defense, 47 U. RICH. L. REV.
495, 499-500 (2013) (explaining that the "rotten social background" theory
hypothesizes that "severe environmental deprivation" causes a defendant to
commit a crime, thereby constituting a defense).
3. See MICHAEL H. TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 17-18 (1996).
4. H. L. A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 51 (1968).
5. Richard Delgado, "Rotten Social Background": Should the Criminal Law
Recognize a Defense of Severe Environmental Deprivation?, 3 LAW & INEQ. 9
(1985). See Marie-Eve Sylvestre, Rethinking Criminal Responsibility for Poor
Offenders: Choice, Monstrosity, and the Logic of Practice, 55 MCGILL L.J. 771
(2010) (discussing the gap between theory and practice in reference to people's
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Antony Duff accepts that his communicative theory of
punishment is not suitable in our present inequitable world.
"[Plunishment is not justifiable within our present legal system; it
will not be justifiable unless and until we have brought about deep
and far-reaching social, political, legal and moral changes in
ourselves and our society."7 Duff believes that our failure to accord
all citizens the concern and respect that they deserve provides
disadvantaged offenders with the strongest moral basis for
resisting punishment, "not because their actions are justified, nor
because they ought to be excused, but because we lack the moral
standing to condemn them."8
Jeffrie G. Murphy and Andrew von Hirsch abandoned what is
termed the "unfair advantage theory of punishment"' because it
requires "a heroic belief in the justice of the underlying social
arrangements. Unless it is in fact true that our social and political
systems have succeeded in providing for mutual benefits for all
members including any criminal offender, then the offender has
not necessarily gained from others' law abiding behavior."1
"actual material conditions"); see also Claire Finkelstein, Excuses and Dispositions
in Criminal Law, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 317 (2002); David Gray, Punishment as
Suffering, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1619 (2010); Dan Markel, Against Mercy, 88 MINN. L.
REV. 1421 (2004).
6. R. A. DUFF, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS 294 (1986).
7. Id.
8. Anthony [sic] Duff, Punishment, Citizenship & Responsibility, in
PUNISHMENT, EXCUSES AND MORAL DEVELOPMENT 17, 32 n.17 (Henry Tam ed.,
1996).
9. This is the theory that offenders should be punished because they have
taken unfair advantage of their victims and the community in general. This theory
maintains that the criminal law confers benefits on all persons by prohibiting
certain harmful acts and that these benefits can only be enjoyed if all people
exercise self-restraint and do not infringe upon the criminal law. Lawbreakers
enjoy the benefits conferred by the law, but renounce the obligations (burdens)
observed by the rest of the community. They deserve to be punished because, by
offending, they have taken unfair advantage of the restraints observed by the rest
of the community. Punishment thereby restores the fair balance of benefits and
burdens that is disturbed by crime. See, e.g., JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND
NATURAL RIGHTS 263-64 (1980) ("[P]unishment rectifies the disturbed pattern of
distribution of advantages and disadvantages throughout a community by
depriving the convicted criminal...."); JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, RETRIBUTION,
JUSTICE AND THERAPY 82-115 (1979) (discussing Immanuel Kant and Karl Marx's
theories of criminal punishment and retribution, respectively); WOJCIECH
SADURSKI, GIVING DESERT ITS DUE 221-60 (1985) (discussing punishment and
the theory of justice); Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, in PUNISHMENT
AND REHABILITATION 40 (Jeffrie G. Murphy ed., 1973) (asserting that there is a
right to punishment).
10. ANDREW VON HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES 58 (1985). See also
Jeffrie G. Murphy, Marxism and Retribution, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 217 (1973).
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There is no obvious answer to what ought to be done to
remedy the problem of offenders from deprived backgrounds. In
this Article, the focus is on the sentencing systems in the United
States and Australia. This perspective is apt, given the
contrasting approaches to disadvantage in these countries. In
Australia, formally at least, disadvantage is a mitigating
consideration, whereas it does not reduce penalty harshness in the
United States.11  Despite this, as we shall see, the most
disadvantaged group in the Australian community (Indigenous
Australians) is imprisoned at a proportionally far higher rate than
the most disadvantaged group in the United States (African
Americans). 12
I conclude that the solution to the link between poverty and
imprisonment rests in conferring a sentencing discount to
disadvantaged offenders, but only for certain forms of crimes. No
discount is appropriate for serious sexual and violent offenders,
because the empirical evidence suggests that these offences are
profoundly damaging to the lives of victims and the heinousness of
such conduct is something that is appreciated by all non-
cognitively impaired people. 3 Rich or poor, people know it is
manifestly wrong to commit assault or violate the sexual
autonomy of others. 4 In relation to other less serious offences, a
disadvantaged offender discount should apply even though,
ultimately, the main determinant of crime seriousness is the
impact on the victim, not the culpability of the offender. The
criminal justice system should, to some extent, recognise the
burden of poverty and its association with crime. This is best done
by conferring less severe penalties on disadvantaged offenders for
relatively minor offences.
In addition to making socio-economic disadvantage a
mitigating factor for certain crime, there is a need to eliminate the
significance attached to aggravating factors that unfairly weigh
against impoverished offenders. The main consideration to this
end is the recidivist premium, whereby repeat offenders are
sentenced to considerably harsher penalties than first-time
offenders. Disadvantaged offenders generally have more prior
11. See infra Part III.
12. Id.
13. See C. L. TEN, CRIME, GUILT, AND PUNISHMENT: A PHILOSOPHICAL
INTRODUCTION 124 (1987) (discussing the knowledge of a mentally ill offender
related to the "'nature and quality of the act' being done).




convictions than other offenders." Accordingly, the recidivist
loading is applied more frequently and acutely to this group of
offenders. 6 This is discriminatory because a close examination of
the recidivist loading shows that it is unjustifiable from the
normative and empirical perspective.17
An incidental benefit of ensuring that poverty mitigates
penalty for less serious criminal offences is that it would provide
institutional recognition of the hardships stemming from poverty
and hence increase the likelihood of broader measures being
implemented to ameliorate disadvantage. A key aspect of the
solution to the link between crime and disadvantage is reducing
the social and economic gap between the richest and poorest in the
community. Criminal justice scholars are unlikely to strongly
influence the measures needed to address this matter. 8 However,
we can contribute to the growing number of reasons for remedying
this failing. This Article aims to make such a contribution and in
particular stresses the need to improve education outcomes for the
most disadvantaged.
The backdrop to the Article is developed in the next section
(Part II), where I discuss the nature and prevalence of poverty, the
hardship caused by imprisonment, and the connection between
poverty and imprisonment. This is followed, in Part III, by a
discussion of the extent to which poverty currently mitigates
penalty severity. Part IV contains the key law reform proposals in
the Article, and in particular sets out how the law should be
reformed to properly and best accommodate poverty in the
sentencing calculus. In Part V, I argue that aggravating factors
(in particular, the recidivist premium) that operate unjustly
against the poor should be abolished or moderated. The scope and
limits of my recommendations are set out in Part VI. The
concluding remarks are contained in Part VII and consist of the
key recommendations in the Article.
15. See infra Part II.
16. See infra Part V.
17. Id.
18. For a discussion of the limits of sentencing reform, see Leslie Sebba, Is
Sentencing Reform a Lost Cause? A Historical Perspective on Conceptual Problems
in Sentencing Research, 76 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 237 (2013).
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II. Scene Setting: Definitional Matters, the Extent of
Poverty Among Prison Inmates, the Pain of
Imprisonment, and the Connection Between Crime and
Poverty
A. Definitional Matters
The term "disadvantaged" can have many different
meanings. In this Article, I have confined its coverage or usage to
economic disadvantage, that is, persons or prisoners who are on or
below the poverty line.
B. Poverty: Its Frequency and Representation in Prison
Statistics
Poverty is a significant problem in the United States and
Australia. In the United States, 15% of the population live in
poverty.1" In Australia, the portion of the community that lives in
poverty is slightly less, namely 12.8%.20
There have been numerous studies that demonstrate a direct
link between poverty and crime and consequently higher
imprisonment rates for the poor.21 The relevant crime statistics
19. See Carmen DeNavas-Walt et al., Income, Poverty and Health Insurance
Coverage in the United States: 2012, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 13 (2013), http://www
.census.gov/prod/2013pubs/p60-245.pdf. This is defined as an annual income of
50% of the official poverty line; for an individual this amounts to $11,720 annually,
and for a family of four it is $23,492. Id. at 51. In 2012, 20.4 million Americans
reported an income "below one-half of their poverty threshold." Id. at 18. For a
discussion of the poverty defence in the context of an increasing poverty rate, see
Gilman, supra note 2, at 496.
20. AUSTRALIAN COUNCIL OF SOC. SERV., POVERTY IN AUSTRALIA (2012),
http://acoss.org.auuploads/ACOSS%2OPoverty%2OReport%202012-Final.pdf.
Poverty is defined as 50% of the median income (which for an adult is $18,616
annually, and for a couple with two children is $39,104 annually). Id. at 6. This
means that 2.265 million Australians lived in poverty in 2010. Id. It was noted
that poverty increased one-third of a percentage point from 2003 to 2010. See id. at
37.
21. See, e.g., Stuart P. Green, Symposium Article, Hard Times, Hard Time:
Retributive Justice for Unjustly Disadvantaged Offenders, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
43, 48 (2010) (arguing that punishment should depend on poverty, subject to
variables like type of crime committed); Harry J. Holzer et al., The Economic Costs
of Childhood Poverty in the United States, 14 J. CHILD. & POVERTY 41 (2008)
(estimating that childhood poverty costs the United States $500 billion each year);
Don Weatherburn & Bronwyn Lind, What Mediates the Macro-Level Effects of
Economic and Social Stress on Crime?, 39 AUSTL. & N.Z. J. CRIMINOLOGY 384-97
(2006) (noting that parental neglect has a stronger connection with crime than
poverty in relation to juveniles, however, there is a strong link between poverty
and parental neglect). For a discussion of the link between poverty and homicide,
see William Alex Pridemore, Poverty Matters: A Reassessment of the Inequality-
Homicide Relationship in Cross-National Studies, 51 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 739
(2011); Paul B. Stretesky et al., Space Matters: An Analysis of Poverty, Poverty
2015]
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that are the most wide-ranging and regularly updated do not
directly map poverty and imprisonment.22 Rather, the relationship
is typically and best demonstrated by reference to race and
imprisonment, and to this end, race is used as a proxy for
economic (and social) disadvantage.23 This is a reliable indicator of
poverty, given the breadth and depth of the disadvantage
experienced by certain racial minority groups.
It is manifestly clear that in Australia the Indigenous
community is the worst off according to a large range of measures
of flourishing. 4 The Indigenous have the lowest life expectancy in
Australia, with the gap between Indigenous males and non-
Indigenous males estimated at 11.5 years, and 9.7 years for
females. In 2012, infant mortality was almost twice as high for
Indigenous infants compared to non-Indigenous infants.2 ' The
rate of high school completion for non-Indigenous students was
81%, but only 51% for Indigenous students. 7  Indigenous
Australians are far less likely to be employed, with their
unemployment rate at 17% compared to 4% for non-Indigenous
Australians. 28 The Indigenous homeless rate is fourteen times that
Clustering, and Violent Crime, 21 JUST. Q. 817 (2004). In relation to the link
between poverty and violent crime in general, see Avelardo Valdez et al.,
Aggressive Crime, Alcohol and Drug Use, and Concentrated Poverty in 24 U.S.
Urban Areas, 33 AM. J. DRUG & ALCOHOL ABUSE 595 (2007). See also NEW
SOUTH WALES DEP'T OF JUV. JUST., 2003 NSW YOUNG PEOPLE IN CUSTODY
HEALTH SURVEY: KEY FINDINGS REPORT (2003) (discussing the results of a
survey into the background, health, and risk behaviours of young Australians in
custody); Morgan Kelly, Inequality and Crime, 82 REV. ECON. & STAT. 530-39
(2000) (discussing the differential relation between crime types and inequality);
Robert E. Larzelere & Gerald R. Patterson, Parental Management: Mediator of the
Effect of Socioeconomic Status on Early Delinquency, 28 CRIMINOLOGY 301 (1990)
(finding that the effect of socioeconomic status on delinquency was not significant
after controlling for parental monitoring and discipline).
22. Darren Wheelock & Christopher Uggen, Race, Poverty and Punishment:
The Impact of Criminal Sanctions on Racial, Ethnic, and Socioeconomic Inequality
13 (Nat'l Poverty Ctr. Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 6-15, 2006)
(discussing how data on the number of prisoners who are impoverished are
imperfect and involve a degree of estimation).
23. Id. at 11 (noting that "[iut is virtually impossible to discuss the prevalence of
racial and ethnic minorities in criminal justice without discussing crucial group
differences in socio-economic backgrounds").
24. See COUNCIL OF AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENTS, CLOSING THE GAP IN
INDIGENOUS DISADVANTAGE, available at http://www.coag.gov.auclosing-the-gap
in indigenous-disadvantage.
25. AUSTRALIAN INST. OF HEALTH AND WELFARE, AUSTRALIA'S WELFARE
2013 405, 409 (2013).
26. Id. at 410.
27. Id. at 425.
28. Id. at 434.
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of non-Indigenous Australians, 2 and the average income for
Indigenous Australians is 0.7 that of non-Indigenous Australians."
A similar situation of relative disadvantage exists in the
United States in relation to African Americans. In relation to
income and poverty measures, the bleakness of the situation is
highlighted by a report noting that the wealth disparity has not
improved over the past fifty years and is in fact worsening." The
unemployment rate of African Americans is approximately double
that of White Americans. 2 The median household income of
African Americans is $32,068, while for White Americans it is
$54,620." The African American poverty rate is nearly three
times that of White Americans: 28% compared to 10%.14 White
Americans live, on average, 3.8 years longer than African
Americans. 5  The high school completion rate of African
Americans is approximately 62% compared to 80% for Whites.
In the United States and Australia, African Americans and
Indigenous Australians, respectively, have the highest rates of
imprisonment. The disproportionate rate at which these groups
are imprisoned is profound. The rate of imprisonment of African
Americans in the United States is more than six times higher than
the White American population. 7 Bruce Western and Becky Pettit
29. Id. at 418.
30. NICHOLAS BIDDLE, CAEPR INDIGENOUS POPULATION PROJECT: 2011
CENSUS PAPERS, PAPER 11 INCOME 5 (2013). In 2006, the portion of Indigenous
people who had an annual income between $1 and $149 was 9.5%, while in 2011
about 12.5% had an annual income between $1 and $199. For the same time period
and income bracket, the percentages of non-Indigenous people were 7.6% and 7.9%,
respectively. Id. at 5, 7.
31. Brad Plumer, These Ten Charts Show the Black-White Economic Gap
Hasn't Budged in 50 Years, WONKBLOG (Aug. 28, 2013), http://www.washington
post.comlblogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/08/28/these-seven-charts-show-the-black-white-
economic-gap-hasnt-budged-in-50-years! (summarizing data taken from official
government sources).
32. Id. (noting that 12.6% of African Americans are unemployed compared to
6.6% of White Americans).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. KENNETH D. KOCHANEK ET AL., How DID CAUSE OF DEATH CONTRIBUTE
TO RACIAL DIFFERENCES IN LIFE EXPECTANCY IN THE UNITED STATES IN 2010?,
NCHS Data Brief, no. 125 (July 2013) (showing that the average age of death for
White persons was 78.9 years, compared to 75.1 years for African Americans),
available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db125.htm.
36. Christopher B. Swanson & Sterling C. Lloyd, Graduation Rate
Approaching Milestone, EDUC. WEEK (May 31, 2013), http://www.edweek.org/ew
/article s/2013/06/06/34analysis.h32.html.
37. Heather C. West et al., PRISONERS IN 2009, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE
(2010), available at http://bjs.gov/contentpub/pdf/p09.pdf [hereinafter U.S. DEP'T
OF JUST. 2009]. See PRISON REFORM TRUST, BROMLEY PRISON FACTFILE (2012),
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show that the rate of incarceration of African American men who
have dropped out of high school in the United States has surged
from 10% in 1980 to 37% in 2008.38 Remarkably, by 2008, African
American males under age thirty-five who had not completed high
school were more likely to be imprisoned than employed, and more
than two-thirds of African American males who have not
completed high school are expected to serve time in prison at some
point in their lives.
In Australia, the over-representation of Indigenous prisoners
in the total prison population is even greater, currently reaching a
disturbing ratio of 15:1 compared to the rest of the community.40
This is approximately 2.5 times the over-representation rate of
African Americans in United States imprisonment.41 The United
States has overall a much higher rate of imprisonment than
Australia: 626 per 100,000 adult population4 2 compared to 170 per
100,000 adult population.43 As an aside, this means that the rate
of imprisonment of African Americans compared to Indigenous
Australians is approximately one-fourth more.44 In Australia, it is
1914 per 100,000 of the Indigenous population,45 while in the
United States it is over 3000 per 100,000 of the African American
population.46  Thus, while the over-representation rate of
Indigenous Australians compared to White Australians is higher
than the corresponding measure relating to African Americans in
available at http://www.prisonreformtrust.org.uk/Portals/0/Documents/FactfileJune
2012.pdf (showing that the over-representation of racial minorities in the United
Kingdom is similar).
38. Bruce Western & Becky Pettit, Incarceration & Social Inequality, 139
DAEDALUS 10 (2010).
39. Id. at 12, 16.
40. AUSTRALIAN BUREAU OF STAT., 4517.0 - PRISONERS IN AUSTRALIA
(2013), available at http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Latestproducts/BD00
21D329F0464FCA257B3C000DCCE0?opendocument.
41. Compare U.S. DEP'T OF JUST. 2009, supra note 37 (finding that six times
more African Americans are imprisoned than White Americans in the U.S.), with
AUSTRALIAN BUREAU OF STAT., supra note 40 (finding that Indigenous prisoners
outnumber non-Indigenous by a ratio of 15:1 in Australia).
42. E. Ann Carson & Daniela Golinelli, PRISONERS IN 2012 - ADVANCE
COUNTS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE (2013), available at http://www.bjs.gov/index
.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=4737.
43. AUSTRALIAN BUREAU OF STAT., supra note 40.
44. Compare U.S. DEP'T OF JUST. 2009, supra note 37 (finding that 626 per
100,000 adults are imprisoned in the U.S.), with AUSTRALIAN BUREAU OF STAT.,
supra note 40 (finding that 170 per 100,000 adults are imprisoned in Australia).
45. AUSTRALIAN BUREAU OF STAT., supra note 40.
46. Paul Guerino et al., PRISONERS IN 2010, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE 7 (2011)
[hereinafter U.S. DEP'T OF JUST. 2010].
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the United States, the latter group is still imprisoned at a higher
rate than Indigenous Australians.47
C. The Pain of Imprisonment
Apart from the exceptional case of execution, the harshest
punitive sanction that the communities in the United States and
Australia may impose on their citizens is imprisonment.48 This is
the sharp end of sentencing. It is important that this penalty is
imposed only in appropriate circumstances given the enormity of
what is at stake. The impact of incarceration is seriously
debilitating. The direct adverse impact of prison conditions has
been well documented, and, it has been known for several decades
that the "pains" of imprisonment extend far beyond the
deprivation of liberty.0  Other negative consequences of
imprisonment include:
1) the deprivation of goods and services;5 1
2) the deprivation of heterosexual relationships;5 2
3) the deprivation of autonomy;53 and
4) the deprivation of security.
Less well-known are the wider harms caused by imprisonment.
Imprisonment has an adverse effect on well-being measures long
after the conclusion of the sentence, even to the point of
significantly reducing life expectancy.
A study which examined the 15.5-year survival rate of 23,510
prisoners who were imprisoned on June 30, 1991, in the State of
Georgia, found much higher mortality rates for ex-prisoners than
for the rest of the population.56  Also, the mortality rate during
47. Compare the results of supra note 41, with AUSTRALIAN BUREAU OF STAT.,
supra note 40, and U.S. DEP'T OF JUST. 2010, supra note 46.
48. See my observations in Part III of this Article regarding the relevance of
capital cases to this discussion. Australia has abolished the death penalty.
49. GRESHAM M. SYKES, THE SOCIETY OF CAPTIVES: A STUDY OF A MAXIMUM
SECURITY PRISON 63 (1958).
50. Id. at 64.
51. Id. at 67.
52. Id. at 70.
53. Id. at 73.
54. Id. at 76. See also Robert Johnson & Hans Toch, Introduction, in THE
PAINS OF IMPRISONMENT 17 (Robert Johnson & Hans Toch eds., 1982) ("Sykes
... five basic deprivations.., together dealt a 'profound hurt' that went to 'the very
foundations of the prisoner's being."').
55. Anne C. Spaulding et al., Prisoner Survival Inside and Outside of the





incarceration was much lower than for the post-release period. 7
There were 2650 deaths in total, which was a 43% higher
mortality rate than normally expected (799 more ex-prisoners died
than expected).5 8 The main causes for the increased mortality rates
were homicide, transportation injuries, accidental poisoning
(which included drug overdoses), and suicide.
Moreover, imprisonment has a considerable impact on
economic opportunity, because it leads to diminished employment
opportunities0 and reduces lifetime earnings by up to 40%.1 The
hardship of prison transcends the trajectory of former prisoners.
Males who have been imprisoned are four times more likely to
assault their partners than men who have never been
imprisoned. 2
Imprisonment is obviously meant to be a stern punishment.
However, the extent to which it sets back the interests of offenders
is not manifest. Given the damaging impact it can have on the life
journey of offenders, it is essential that this disposition is
appropriately utilised. The disproportionate use of imprisonment
in defined sections of the community requires close analysis. This
is the focus of the remainder of the Article.
D. The Link Between Crime and Poverty
The reasons for the connection between poverty and crime
are multi-faceted and not fully understood. The increased
inclination toward crime resulting from disadvantage stems
broadly from the lack of resources and opportunities that are an
almost unavoidable aspect of economic deprivation. Crime often
results from frustration-aggression, 4 which can stem from being
subjected to inequality that is entrenched by poverty, poor schools,
violent neighbourhoods, racism, and single-parent families.
5
Further, it is established that poverty negatively affects the
57. Id.
58. Id. at 482.
59. Id. at 484.
60. Wheelock & Uggen, supra note 22, at 18.
61. Western & Pettit, supra note 38, at 13.
62. Id. at 15.
63. See Judith R. Blau & Peter M. Blau, The Cost of Inequality: Metropolitan
Structure and Violent Crime, 47 AM. SOC. REV. 114, 117 (1982).
64. Id. at 119 (explaining that substantial wealth disparities mean that "there
are great riches within view but not within reach of many people destined to live in
poverty ... [causing] resentment, frustration, hopelessness and alienation" among
the poor).
65. Delgado, supra note 5, at 23-24.
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development of children, contributing to poor impulse control, low
self-esteem, and reduced educational achievements, all of which
are conducive to harmful activity such as crime."
Poor children ... are more likely to be exposed to more
environmental toxins and pollutants, and to live in less
sanitary and lower quality homes that, in turn, tend to be
located in places that are dangerous and physically
deteriorated. Children who live in low income areas also tend
to attend poorer quality schools and receive substandard
overall municipal and social services. Thus, the
environmental injustices to which the poor are subjected affect
their children in numerous ways.
An individual's experiences, especially early in life, have a
profound impact on the decisions, choices, and actions they
perform. Craig Haney has observed:
[R]esearch confirms that traumas experienced earlier in
someone's life-whether caused by structural forces like
poverty and the effects of racial discrimination, or more direct
forms of maltreatment like parental abuse and neglect-can
be deeply 'criminogenic' (that is, persons exposed to them have
a higher probability of subsequently engaging in m 6'
Accordingly, the environment of poor children inclines them
to delinquency and destructive conduct.69 The lack of resources
associated with poverty diminishes the capacity of parents to
nurture and correct aberrant behaviour before it becomes socially
and individually destructive.0 Poverty is also closely associated
with child neglect, which carries associated and considerable
independent damaging effects.71 Lack of exposure to appropriate
role models and normative standards are also key catalysts for
committing crime. Additionally, there is an established link
between poverty and victimisation. Poor people are far more
likely to be the victims of most forms of crime, including serious
66. Craig Haney, Evolving Standards of Decency: Advancing the Nature and
Logic of Capital Mitigation, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 835, 865-66 (2008).
67. Id. at 871.
68. Id. at 857.
69. Id. at 871-72.
70. See Lawrence D. Bobo, Crime, Urban Poverty and Social Science, 6 DU
BOIS REV.: SOC. SC. RES. ON RACE 273 (2009); Delgado, supra note 5, at 27-28,
33; Michael B. Greene, Chronic Exposure to Violence and Poverty: Interventions
That Work for Youth, 39 CRIME & DELINQ. 106 (1993).
71. Julie L. Crouch & Joel S. Milner, Effects of Child Neglect on Children, 20
CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 49 (1993); Haney, supra note 66, at 866-68.
72. PER-OLOF H. WIKSTROM ET AL., BREAKING RULES: THE SOCIAL AND
SITUATIONAL DYNAMICS OF YOUNG PEOPLE'S URBAN CRIME (2012); Joan McCord




sexual and violent offences.73  For example, the rate of
victimisation of people from households earning less than $7500
per year is nearly three times that of people in households earning
more than $75,000 annually.4 In poor communities, exposure to
criminal activity normalises it, thereby diminishing the
disinclination to engage in such activity.1
A broader reason for the link between poverty and crime is
the choice-limiting effect of deprivation. People have free will.
Even against a backdrop of a deterministic theory of human
action, it is accepted that there is a role for moral and legal
responsibility. 8 Yet, there are degrees of freedom. It is for this
reason that when choice is limited to a profound degree, it can
constitute a defence to crime, as in the recognised defences of
necessity or duress.0 It is the capacity of poverty to limit choice,
especially in a manner that inclines people to criminal behaviour,
making it more tenable to suggest that the poor are less culpable
when they commit crime.
It is not suggested that poverty directly causes crime-most
poor people do not commit crime."81  In relation to the over-
representation of African Americans in prisons, a recent study of
73. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE U.S., 2003
STATISTICAL TABLES (2005), tbl.14.
74. Wheelock & Uggen, supra note 22, at 15-16, fig.5 (showing that African
Americans are the most victimised group in the United States).
75. See also McCord & McCord, supra note 72, at 69 (researching the effect of a
criminal parental role model and finding that "sons of criminals had a significantly
higher incidence of criminality than did sons of non-deviants").
76. See Gilman, supra note 2, at 507-10 (discussing the theory that poverty
creates constrained choices, thus necessitating a defence acknowledging the
"coercive effects of deprivation").
77. See HART, supra note 4, at 180-84.
78. See Robert Young, The Implications of Determinism, in A COMPANION TO
ETHICS 534 (Peter Singer ed., 1991) (explaining that deterministic theory states
that all human action is causally determined); see also Stephen J. Morse, Severe
Environmental Deprivation (aka RSB): A Tragedy, Not a Defense, 2 ALA. C.R. &
C.L. L. REV. 147, 149 (2011) ("[11f causation or determinism per se were an excuse,
no one would ever be responsible for any behavior.") [hereinafter Morse I].
79. See HART, supra note 4, at 180-84 (arguing that responsibility should be
reinterpreted to "stress the much more nearly universal ideas of fairness or justice
and of the value of individual liberty").
80. For a discussion of the excuses in the criminal law, see TEN, supra note 13,
at 86-122. For a discussion regarding the importance of human choice to
criminality, see HART, supra note 4, at 180-84. The analogy with the defences of
necessity and duress, so far as sentencing is concerned, is discussed below.
81. See, e.g., Green, supra note 21, at 47 (pointing out that studies that show a
lower income makes one more likely to commit crime does not mean that "all or
even a particularly significant percentage of impoverished people commit
crime... ").
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the relevant considerations noted that a range of other factors is
also at work.8 2  On the whole, "study findings suggest that a
variety of factors, including law enforcement practices, crime
rates, and punitive sentencing policies, contribute to racial
disparities in criminal justice involvement."83 The extent to which
these considerations operate independently or cumulatively with
poverty in the context of criminal behaviour is unclear. However,
it is manifest that there is a connection between disadvantage and
crime.
In a nutshell, people do not choose poverty. Economic
disadvantage limits choice and can foster frustration and
rebellion." It also means that people have less to lose. By
contrast, wealth confers freedom, comfort, and power. It also
provides a motivation to maintain and improve one's current
situation and a sense of optimism. The reason that financially
prosperous people often do not commit crime is because they have
too much to lose from the incidental adverse consequences of a
conviction, including the negative impact on their employment,
reputation, and resource base. Poverty of itself often does not lead
to criminality, however, when combined with certain other
immediate circumstances, it may do so.
Thus, from a pragmatic perspective, given that the
disadvantaged have a number of factors that incline them towards
crime and have less to lose by engaging in such conduct, they are
less culpable when they transgress the criminal law. The
disadvantaged are less morally blameworthy for criminal acts
because, relatively speaking, well-off individuals find it easier to
comply with the criminal law and have a greater motivation to do
so. This provides a tenable foundation for inflicting less severe
sanctions on impoverished offenders. In order to analyse the
desirability of this approach, I will now examine the existing
relevant law.
82. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, REDUCING RACIAL DISPARITY IN THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: A MANUAL FOR PRACTITIONERS AND POLICYMAKERS
6 (2008).
83. Id.
84. See Gilman, supra note 2, at 507-10 ("[A] person commits what would
otherwise be a crime due to a choice between two evils: he must violate the criminal
law or someone will suffer a greater harm.").
85. Haney, supra note 66, at 863 ("[T]here is now widespread recognition of the
causal role of both past social history and immediate or present circumstances in
shaping a person's behavior, including his criminal behavior.").
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III. The Current Approach to Poverty as Both a Criminal
Defence and as a Part of Sentence Mitigation
A. United States
There are two ways in which the economic situation of an
offender can be accommodated within the criminal justice process.
One way, and the most significant way, is as a criminal defence.
The second, and less drastic way, is as a mitigating factor in
sentencing. While this Article focuses on the second issue, there is
an overlap between the relevant concepts, which merits a brief
discussion of the possible role of poverty as a criminal defence.
While poverty is not a criminal defence," there has been a
relatively rich discussion of the issue in academic literature.8 7 The
only reported decision in the United States where it has been
suggested that disadvantage should minimise criminal
responsibility is the judgment by Judge Bazelon in United States
v. Alexander." This decision relates to the applicability of social
deprivation in the context of the insanity defence, as opposed to
when mitigating a sentence. However, doctrinally speaking,
similar considerations apply.
In his dissent, Judge Bazelon stated that a "rotten social
background" (i.e., severe economic and social deprivation) should
be available as a defence to a crime where it prevents a defendant
from acting out of free choice." In this case, Benjamin Murdock,
an African American defendant, was charged with two counts of
second-degree murder as a result of shooting and killing two
86. Andrew E. Taslitz, The Rule of Criminal Law: Why Courts and Legislatures
Ignore Richard Delgado's Rotten Social Background, 2 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV.
79, 81-82 (2011).
87. See Paul H. Robinson, Are We Responsible for Who We Are? The Challenge
for Criminal Law Theory in the Defenses of Coercive Indoctrination and 'Rotten
Social Background, 2 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 53 (2011) (discussing the rotten
social background as a form of coercive indoctrination); see also Stephen J. Morse,
Deprivation and Desert, in FROM SOCIAL JUSTICE TO CRIMINAL JUSTICE 114, 153
(William C. Heffernan & John Kleinig eds., 2000) (stating "No convincing theory
suggests that deprived offenders are less morally responsible simply because they
are deprived and therefore deserve excuse or mitigation on that basis alone")
[hereinafter Morse II]; Morse I, supra note 78 (discussing how a severe emotional
background defence may be a tragedy but is not a defence to a crime); Taslitz,
supra note 86 (discussing why Richard Delgado's rotten social background theory
has played an important role in scholarship of criminal responsibility, but not in
case law).
88. United States v. Alexander, 471 F.2d 923 (1973). See Gilman, supra note 2
(noting poverty is actually recognised as a defence in child neglect cases; however,
it is not clear that a defence to a crime that is committed unintentionally is readily
transferrable to other forms of crime); Taslitz, supra note 86, at 80.
89. Alexander, 471 F.2d at 959-60.
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White customers of a fast food store, one of whom racially abused
him.0 He asserted an insanity defence based on the contention
that his rotten social background denied him the ability to control
his behaviour." At trial, he was convicted and the jury was
instructed to ignore his social deprivation in determining guilt and
instead focus on his criminal responsibility. 2 His conviction was
affirmed on appeal. 3 In his dissent, Judge Bazelon stated that
mental illness could not be properly considered by the jury without
taking into account the social background of Murdock. Judge
Bazelon stated:
McDonald [the trial judge] defined mental illness for purposes
of the responsibility defense as an abnormal condition of the
mind that 'substantially affects mental or emotional processes
and substantially impairs behavior controls.' The thrust of
Murdock's defense was that the environment in which he was
raised-his 'rotten social background'-conditioned him to
respond to certain stimuli in a manner most of us would
consider flagrantly inappropriate. Because of his early
conditioning, he argued, he was denied any meaningful choice
when the racial insult triggered the explosion in the
restaurant. He asked the jury to conclude that his 'rotten
social background,' and the resulting impairment of mental or
emotional processes and behavior controls, ruled his violent
reaction in the same manner that the behavior of a paranoid
schizophrenic may be ruled by his 'mental condition.' Whether
this impairment amounted to an 'abnormal condition of the
mind' is, in my opinion, at best an academic question. But the
consequences we predicate on the answer may be very
meaningful indeed.
We have never said that an exculpatory mental illness must
be reflected in some organic or pathological condition. Nor
have we enshrined psychosis as a prerequisite of the defense.
But our experience has made it clear that the terms we use-
'mental disease or defect' and 'abnormal condition of the
mind'-carry a distinct flavor of pathology. And they deflect
attention from the crucial, functional question-did the
defendant lack the ability to make any meaningful choice of
action-to an artificial and misleading excursion into the
thicket of psychiatric diagnosis and nomenclature. 4
The sentiment behind the reasoning of Judge Bazelon has not
struck a chord with legislatures and courts for several reasons.
First, it has been contended that there is no proof that poverty
90. Id. at 928-29.
91. Id. at 959.
92. Id. at 948, 956-59.
93. Id. at 968.
94. Id. at 960-61.
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causes crime. Most poor people do not commit crime. While
there is a correlation between crime and poverty, it does not
establish a causal link. This is an important observation for the
purposes of this Article. The concept of causation, especially in the
legal domain, is a conceptually complex concept and there is no
universally accepted theory of causation.8 While causation may be
a necessary requirement to establish in order for poverty to
ground a legal defence, this is not the case in relation to it acting
as a mitigating factor. As is discussed in Part IV of this Article, in
order for economic deprivation to mitigate penalty, it is enough
(though it may not be sufficient) to establish that poverty inclines
people towards crime.
Second, it has been noted that pragmatically it would be
difficult to establish the exact scope and operation of the defence.
Third, excusing poor offenders from the criminal consequences of
their actions would erode community safety.1 0 Finally, it has been
suggested that it is beyond the scope and objective of the criminal
law to excuse conduct stemming from broader social problems,
which the criminal law is not equipped to rectify.1"1 The objective of
the criminal law is to condemn harmful acts, not to correct social
and economic problems.1 2 Criminal courts are not equipped to
cure social injustices.1 3 It is for these reasons that, while rotten
social background as a criminal defence has generated some
scholarly discussion, it has had "no role whatsoever in the
evolution of case and statutory law.""1 4
In order to understand the current relevance of offender
poverty to sentencing, it is necessary to provide a brief overview of
the sentencing landscape. Each state of the United States has its
95. Robinson, supra note 87, at 10.
96. Delgado, supra note 5, at 10.
97. Robinson, supra note 87, at 59.
98. H. L. A. HART & TONY HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 27-28 (2d ed.
1985). See also THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CAUSATION (Helen Beebee et al. eds.,
2009).
99. Robinson, supra note 87, at 59-61. See also Morse I, supra note 78, at 157.
100. Morse I, supra note 78, at 158.
101. Morse II, supra note 87, at 115.
102. Morse I, supra note 78, at 158.
103. Id. at 156-58 (making a similar observation regarding not making poverty
a defence to crime).
104. Taslitz, supra note 86, at 80 (suggesting that the defence has not been
accepted because it rests on the premise that part of the blame rests on society.
This, in turn, violates important assumptions underpinning the criminal law,
including that culpability cannot be shared between an offender and others,
especially between an offender and society. Also, society cannot be ascribed with
criminal responsibility because it cannot have a mental state.).
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own sentencing system; there is considerable divergence across the
respective regimes. 11 The federal jurisdiction also has a discrete
sentencing system, which is important because of the large
number of offenders sentenced under this system and the doctrinal
influence it has at the state level.0 Despite the sentencing
variations across the United States, several key commonalities
and themes exist.
The key distinguishing aspect of the United States
sentencing system compared to that of Australia (and most other
sentencing systems in the world),0 7 is the wide-ranging use of
mandatory minimum penalties, which in some form exist in every
state."' As noted by Douglas Berman and Stephanos Bibas, "over
the last half-century, sentencing has lurched from a lawless
morass of hidden, unreviewable discretion to a sometimes rigid
and cumbersome collection of rules."109
These mandatory minimum penalties are often set out in
sentencing grids, which typically use a criminal history score and
offence seriousness to calculate the penalty. 10  None of these
policies and practices have emanated from a clear theoretical
foundation, but rather stemmed from "back-of-an-envelope
105. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 609-11 (2000) (citing United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995)) (noting that sentencing and, more
generally, the criminal law in the United States is mainly the province of states).
106. Douglas A. Berman & Stephanos Bibas, Making Sentencing Sensible, 4
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 37, 40-41 (2006).
107. See UNIV. OF S.F. SCH. OF LAW, CTR. FOR LAW AND GLOBAL JUSTICE,
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: U.S. SENTENCING PRACTICES IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT 46-
47 (2012) (noting that 137 of 168 surveyed countries had some form of minimum
penalties but none was as wide-ranging or severe as in the United States).
108. Id. at 45. See also Berman & Bibas, supra note 106, at 47 ("Meanwhile, in
the 1960s and 1970s, scholars and criminal justice professionals began to criticize
broad judicial sentencing discretion. Evidence suggested that similar defendants
often received dissimilar sentences, and some studies found sentence disparities
that correlated with offenders' race, sex, and wealth. Troubled by disparities, the
specter of discrimination, rising crime, and the inefficacy of rehabilitation,
criminal-justice experts proposed broad sentencing reforms to improve consistency
and certainty. Legislatures soon listened."). For further background, see Lynn
Adelman, What the Sentencing Commission Ought to Be Doing: Reducing Mass
Incarceration, 18 MICH. J. RACE & L. 295 (2013) (advocating for sending fewer
people to prison for shorter amounts of time); Richard S. Frase, State Sentencing
Guidelines: Diversity, Consensus, and Unresolved Policy Issues, 105 COLUM. L.
REV. 1190 (2005) (analysing critical areas of diversity and consensus in both
guidelines design and in the philosophical and policy goals of sentencing guideline
reform across states).
109. Berman & Bibas, supra note 106, at 40.
110. Which is based mainly on the number, seriousness, and age of the prior
conviction.
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calculations and collective intuitive judgments." '111 Despite this,
there is a convergence of approach:
Modern sentencing reforms have repudiated rehabilitation as
a dominant goal of sentencing. Many structured sentencing
laws, including many guideline sentencing systems and severe
mandatory minimum sentences, are designed principally to
deter, incapacitate, and punish offenders.11
The most extensively analysed fixed penalty laws are in the
United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual ("the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines").113 These Federal Sentencing
Guidelines are no longer mandatory in nature, following the U.S.
Supreme Court decision in United States v. Booker.114 However,
sentences within guideline ranges are still imposed in
approximately 60% of cases.15  Sentence enhancements apply to
most types of offences, including drug, fraud, and immigration
crime.1 A United States Sentencing Commission Report in 2011
111. Michael Tonry, The Questionable Relevance of Previous Convictions to
Punishments for Later Crimes, in PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS AT SENTENCING:
THEORETICAL AND APPLIED PERSPECTIVES 91, 93 (Julian V Roberts & Andrew
von Hirsch eds., 2010) [hereinafter PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS]. For criticism of the
guidelines, see Albert W. Alschuler, Disparity: The Normative and Empirical
Failure of the Federal Guidelines, 58 STAN. L. REV. 85, 92-93 (2005); James S.
Gwin, Juror Sentiment on Just Punishment: Do the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
Reflect Community Values?, 4 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 173 (2010).
112. Berman & Bibas, supra note 106, at 48.
113. FED. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (2012), available at http://www
.ussc.gov/Guidelines/2012_Guidelines/ManualPDF/2012_GuidelinesManualFull.
pdf [hereinafter GUIDELINES 1].
114. See Sarah French Russell, Rethinking Recidivist Enhancements: The Role of
Prior Drug Convictions in Federal Sentencing, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1135, 1160
(2010); see also Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229 (2011) (finding that when
a defendant's sentence has been set aside on appeal and his case remanded for
resentencing, a district court may consider evidence of the defendant's
rehabilitation since his prior sentencing, and such evidence may support a
downward variance from the advisory Federal Sentencing Guidelines range);
Irizarry v. United States, 553 U.S. 708 (2008) (holding a sentence outside the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines carries no presumption of unreasonableness);
Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 255-59 (2008) (holding that absent a
government appeal or cross-appeal, the sentence defendant receives cannot be
increased by the Court of Appeals); Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007)
(giving judges discretion to make decisions outside the scope of sentencing
guidelines); Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) (holding that there is no rule
that requires "extraordinary" circumstances to justify a sentence outside Federal
Sentencing Guidelines range); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005)
(holding that aspects (the guarantee of trial by jury) of the guidelines that were
mandatory were contrary to the Sixth Amendment).
115. Russell, supra note 114, at 1160.
116. Id. at 1157 n.112.
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noted that the number of offences with set terms is increasing and
the terms were increasing.17
In terms of establishing the appropriate sentence, apart from
offence severity, the other key variable that determines the
sanction is the prior history of the offender.118 In relation to most
offences, an extensive criminal history can approximately double
the presumptive sentence. For example, an offence at level
fourteen 9  in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines1 2 carries a
presumptive penalty for a first time offender of imprisonment for
fifteen to twenty-one months, which increases to thirty-seven to
forty-six months for an offender with thirteen or more criminal
history points.1 2  For an offence at level thirty-six, a first time
offender has a presumptive penalty of 188 to 235 months, which
increases to 324 to 405 months for an offender with the highest
criminal history score.2 Thus, a bad criminal history can add
between 136 to 170 months (over fourteen years) to a jail term.12 3
The key aspect of this sentencing regime for the purposes of
this Article is that poverty is irrelevant to the determination of a
sentence.12 There is no formal or informal mechanism for
accommodating this disadvantage into sentencing.1 2 5 However, for
reasons discussed in Part V, it is noteworthy that prior criminal
history is a weighty aggravating factor in determining a sentence.
117. Memorandum from the Office of Gen. Counsel to U.S. Sentencing Comm'rs
(May 20, 2011) [hereinafter Memorandum]. See also David M. Zlotnick, The War
Within the War on Crime: The Congressional Assault on Judicial Sentencing
Discretion, 57 SMU L. REV. 211, 223 n.86 (2004) (citing Karen Lutjen, Culpability
and Sentencing Under Mandatory Minimums and the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines: The Punishment No Longer Fits the Criminal, 10 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 388, 441 (1996) ("[Tjhe guidelines are superior to mandatory
minimums because ... [the] Commission not only has developed relatively narrow
ranges within which a judge is to sentence an offender, but it has also provided a
limited opportunity for departure.")).
118. Carissa Byrne Hessick, Why Are Only Bad Acts Good Sentencing Factors?,
88 B.U. L. REV. 1109, 1110-11 (2008) (stating the importance of the prior history
of the offender in sentencing considerations).
119. GUIDELINES I, supra note 113, at 11, 62, 66, 138 (describing offence levels
as ranging from one (least serious) to forty-three (most serious). Examples of level
14 offences are criminal sexual abuse of a ward; failure to register as a sex offender
(tier II) and bribery).
120. Id. at 394.
121. Id. (stating that the criminal history score ranges from zero (least offending
record) to thirteen or more (worst offending record)).
122. Id.
123. Id. The highest criminal score range of 324-405 subtracting the first time





There is one exception to the irrelevance of poverty to
sentencing in the United States.126 This is in relation to death
penalty cases,127 where the capital mitigation doctrine enables a
jury to take into account a number of considerations in
determining whether an accused should be spared the death
penalty.18 The connection between poverty and crime has been
acknowledged by the U.S. Supreme Court for nearly thirty years. 9
In California v. Brown, Justice O'Connor noted "defendants who
commit criminal acts that are attributable to a disadvantaged
background, or to emotional and mental problems, may be less
culpable than defendants who have no such excuse. '
The number of executions in the United States annually is
relatively small and constitutes a numerically negligible portion of
all criminal sentences in the United States. 31 Accordingly, capital
mitigation considerations have not been infused into the general
norms of sentencing law and practice. This is also explained by
the fact that capital penalty cases (given the permanency and
dramatic nature of the penalty) are set apart from all other
sentencing cases." However, as we shall see below, from the
126. Haney, supra note 66, at 844. ("A mitigating counter-narrative that
incorporates a capital defendant's social history and immediate life circumstances
is now recognized as the centerpiece of an effective penalty phase trial.").
127. Id. at 845-55.
128. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982) (vacating death sentence and
remanding because the state court refused to consider as a mitigating circumstance
the petitioner's "unhappy upbringing and emotional disturbance," including
"evidence of a turbulent family history... [and] beatings by a harsh father...");
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (holding that mitigation is very broad
because it includes any matter that serves "as a basis for a sentence less than
death"); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (finding that the
requirement of mandatory death without consideration of the character and record
of defendant or the details of the offence was inconsistent with principles of the
Eighth Amendment); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (allowing mitigating
factors to be considered in sentencing to provide guidance to the sentencing
authority and reduce the likelihood that it will impose an arbitrary sentence).
129. California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538 (1987).
130. Id. at 545. See also Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003) (holding
counsel's decision not to investigate client's background for further mitigating
evidence fell short of professional standards of conduct).
131. STATES WITH AND WITHOUT THE DEATH PENALTY, http://www.deathpenalty
info.org/states-and-without-death-penalty (last visited Oct. 2, 2014). Thirty-two
states in the U.S. still have the death penalty. Id. Between 1976 and September
18, 2014, there have been 1389 executions. EXECUTIONS BY YEAR SINCE 1976,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions-year (last visited Oct. 2, 2014) (noting
that there were forty-three executions and thirty-nine executions in 2012 and 2013,
respectively).
132. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605 ("Given that the imposition of death by public
authority is so profoundly different from all other penalties, we cannot avoid the
conclusion that an individualized decision is essential in capital cases. The need for
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doctrinal perspective, the observation by the U.S. Supreme Court
that poverty can reduce culpability is relevant to the broad nature
of mitigation.3
For the sake of completeness, it is relevant to note that in one
instance the U.S. Supreme Court has made an indirect link
between poverty and sentence reduction in a non-capital case.3
In Miller v. Alabama, the Court ruled that mandatory life
imprisonment without parole in regards to offenders under the age
of eighteen breached the prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment in the Eighth Amendment.1 5  In doing so, the
majority of the Court stated that maltreatment (which is more
commonly associated with poverty) is a factor that diminishes
culpability:
[I]f ever a pathological background might have contributed to
a 14-year-old's commission of a crime, it is here. Miller's
stepfather physically abused him; his alcoholic and drug-
addicted mother neglected him; he had been in and out of
foster care as a result; and he had tried to kill himself four
times, the first when he should have been in kindergarten."'
It is important to not overstate the significance of this observation
for the purposes of this Article. The link between poverty and
crime is not the key basis for this decision.1 7 Yet, the above quote
does indicate receptivity by judges towards the concept that
poverty can reduce criminal responsibility and culpability.
B. Australia
Sentencing in each of the nine Australian jurisdictions (the
six states, the Northern Territory, the Australian Capital
Territory, and the Federal jurisdiction) is governed by a
combination of legislation and the common law."3  While
sentencing law differs in each Australian jurisdiction, considerable
convergence exists in relation to key areas. 9 For the purposes of
this Article, the key point of importance regarding sentencing in
treating each defendant in a capital case with that degree of respect due the
uniqueness of the individual is far more important than in noncapital cases.").
133. The argument is developed in Part IV of this Article.
134. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
135. Id. at 2460.
136. Id. at 2469.
137. Instead, the decision was based on the concerns that by failing to take into
account an offender's age and specific characteristics, there was a risk of
disproportionate punishment. Id. at 2467-68.





Australia is that it is largely a discretionary process in which
judges process hundreds of potentially aggravating and mitigating
considerations 140
In contrast to the United States, fixed penalties for serious
offences in Australia are rare.141 The overarching methodology and
conceptual approach that sentencing judges undertake in making
sentencing decisions is the same in each jurisdiction. 14  This
approach is known as "instinctive synthesis. 1 3  The term
originates from the forty-year-old Full Court of the Supreme Court
of Victoria decision of R v Williscroft, where Justices Adam and
Crockett stated: "Now, ultimately every sentence imposed
represents the sentencing judge's instinctive synthesis of all the
various aspects involved in the punitive process. The High
Court of Australia has considered the general methodology for
reaching sentencing decisions on several occasions. 145  The Court
has consistently adopted the instinctive synthesis approach and
rejected the alternative, which is normally referred to as the two-
step approach. 14 The alternative approach involves a court setting
an appropriate sentence commensurate with the severity of the
offence and making allowances up and down in light of relevant
aggravating and mitigating circumstances. 1 7
The proportionality principle is adopted in all jurisdictions. 14 8
A clear statement of the principle of proportionality is found in the
High Court case of Hoare v The Queen: "[A] basic principle of
sentencing law is that a sentence of imprisonment imposed by a
court should never exceed that which can be justified as
appropriate or proportionate to the gravity of the crime considered
in the light of its objective circumstances. 1  In Veen v The Queen





144. R v Williscroft [1975] VR 292, 300.
145. See, e.g., Channon v R (1978) 20 ALR 1; R v Williscroft [1975] VR 292.
146. RICHARD EDNEY & MIRKO BAGARIC, AUSTRALIAN SENTENCING: PRINCIPLES
AND PRACTICE 17 (2007) (stating that the prevailing sentencing technique in
Australia is instinctive synthesis).
147. JOANNA SHAPLAND, BETWEEN CONVICTION AND SENTENCE: THE
PROCESS OF MITIGATION 43 (1981) (discussing how an offender has the
opportunity to rebut the prosecution's recommended sentence in his mitigation
speech).
148. EDNEY & BAGARIC, supra note 146, at 97.
149. Hoare v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 348, 354 (emphasis original).
150. Veen v The Queen (No. 1) (1979) 143 CLR 458, 467.
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that proportionality is the primary aim of sentencing. It is
considered so important that it cannot be trumped even by the
goal of community protection, which at various times has also
been declared as the most important aim of sentencing.15 2 Thus, in
the case of dangerous offenders, while community protection
remains an important objective, at common law it cannot override
the principle of proportionality.153  It is for this reason that
preventive detention is not sanctioned by the common law.
154
Proportionality has also been given statutory recognition in all
. . . . . 155
Australian jurisdictions.
Another important commonality in all Australian
jurisdictions is that aggravating and mitigating factors operate
relatively uniformly throughout the country, despite the different
ways in which they are dealt with by statute. These
considerations stem mainly from the common law and are
continually evolving. There are between 200 and 300 such
factors. 15 '7 Key mitigating considerations include: a plea of guilty;
assistance to law enforcement authorities; remorse; voluntary
151. Veen v The Queen (No. 2) (1988) 164 CLR 465, 472.
152. See Channon v R (1978) 20 ALR 1, 5 (stating that the single purpose of
criminal sanctions is to protect society and the community from further criminal
actions).
153. R v Chivers (1993) 1 Qd R 432, 437-38 (comparing proportionality with
societal protection in regards to sentencing determinations).
154. Chester v The Queen (1988) 165 CLR 611, 618; see also R v Chivers (1993) 1
Qd R 432, 437-38 (stating that a sentence should not be extended beyond what is
proportional in order to increase society's protection).
155. See Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 s 5(1)(a) (providing that the sentence
must be "just and appropriate"); Crimes Sentencing Procedure Act 1999 s 3A(a)
(using the same phrase used in New South Wales); Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) s
6(a)(a) (stating that the sentence must be "commensurate with the seriousness of
the offence."); Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) s 9(1)(a); Sentencing Act 1991
(Vic) s 5(1)(a) (providing that one of the purposes of sentencing is to impose a just
punishment, and that in sentencing an offender the court must have regard to the
gravity of the offence (s 5(2)(c)) and the offender's culpability and degree of
responsibility (s 5(2)(d)); Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) s 10(1)(k)
(emphasising that "the defendant is adequately punished for the offense" in South
Australia); Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 16A(2)(k) (showing the need for a sentencing
court to "adequately punish" the offender is also fundamental to the sentencing of
offenders for Commonwealth matters). In the Northern Territory and Queensland,
the relevant sentencing statute provides that the punishment imposed on the
offender must be just in all the circumstances. See Sentencing Act (NT) s 5(1)(a).
156. Compare Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) s 8 (detailing how mitigation is used by
the court to determine sentencing), with Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 5(2)(g)
(mentioning mitigation as merely one factor in determining sentencing).
157. Compare SHAPLAND, supra note 147, at 55 (identifying 229 factors), with
LA TROBE UNIV., GUILTY, YOUR WORSHIP: A STUDY OF VICTORIA'S
MAGISTRATES' COURTS (1980) (identifying 292 relevant sentencing factors in a
study of Victorian Magistrates' Courts).
Law and Inequality
cessation from offending; voluntary disclosure of crime; psychiatric
and psychological illness; intellectual disability; youthfulness;
good prospects of rehabilitation; previous good character; onerous
prison conditions; forgiveness by the victim; and where the offence
was committed under duress.' Important aggravating factors
are: prior criminal record; significant level of injury or damage
caused by the offence; vulnerability of the victim; high level of
planning; offences committed while on bail or parole; offences
committed with others; and breach of trust.9 The large number of
aggravating and mitigating factors is a key reason why it is not
possible to predict with confidence the exact sentence that will be
imposed in any particular case.
The main problem with Australian sentencing is its
unpredictability and inconsistency.6 The main reason for this is
the instinctive synthesis approach to sentencing.6 The unfettered
discretionary nature of Australian sentencing calculus is
reminiscent of the uncontrolled sentencing process used in parts of
the United States fifty years ago, which lead Justice Marvel
Frankel to describe the system as lawless.6 For the purposes of
this Article, the most important observation regarding the
Australian sentencing system is that social and economic
disadvantage is a mitigating consideration-at least in theory.
In Bugmy v The Queen, the appellant was an Aboriginal who
was raised in a remote country town where alcohol abuse and
violence were endemic.6 He had a long list of prior convictions,
including violent offences, and the sentence he was appealing was
for seriously assaulting a prison officer (for which he was
sentenced to imprisonment for four years and three months, which
was increased to five years on appeal). 4
In allowing the offender's appeal, the High Court of Australia
stated that individuals raised in disadvantaged circumstances
may be less culpable because their formative years may have been
158. For recent discussions about key mitigating factors, see MIRKO BAGARIC &
RICHARD EDNEY, AUSTRALIAN SENTENCING (2011) [hereinafter AUSTRALIAN
SENTENCING].
159. See id.
160. EDNEY & BAGARIC, supra note 146, at 28-33 (discussing how the instinctive
approach to sentencing leads to problems with subjectivity and the rule of law).
161. Id.
162. M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER (1972). For a
critique of Frankel's impact, see Lynn Adelman & Jon Deitrich, Marvin Frankel's
Mistakes and the Need to Rethink Federal Sentencing, 13 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L.
239 (2008).
163. Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCA 37 12.
164. Id. T 2, 4.
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marred by being subjected to negative influences, thereby
impairing their capacity to mature and diminishing their moral
culpability.1 5  Moreover, it noted that this neither dissipates as
the offender grows older nor with the accumulation of prior
convictions."6 The Court stated that social deprivation can
constitute a basis for mitigation not only for Aboriginals, but all
people subjected to disadvantaged upbringing. 7 It also noted that
for mitigation to occur, the social deprivation would need to be
established, not assumed."6 Moreover, social deprivation and a
different cultural upbringing can mitigate if they make prison
more burdensome. 16
In Bugmy, the majority judgment stated:
37. An Aboriginal offender's deprived background may
mitigate the sentence that would otherwise be appropriate for
the offence in the same way that the deprived background of a
non-Aboriginal offender may mitigate that offender's sentence.
In this respect, Simpson J has correctly explained the
significance of the statements in R v Fernando:
'Properly understood, Fernando is a decision, not about
sentencing Aboriginals, but about the recognition, in
sentencing decisions, of social disadvantage that
frequently (no matter what the ethnicity of the offender)
precedes the commission of crime. 7
43. The experience of growing up in an environment
surrounded by alcohol abuse and violence may leave its mark
on a person throughout life. Among other things, a
background of that kind may compromise the person's
capacity to mature and to learn from experience. It is a
feature of the person's make-up and remains relevant to the
determination of the appropriate sentence, notwithstanding
that the person has a long history of offending.
44. Because the effects of profound childhood
deprivation do not diminish with the passage of time and
repeated offending, it is right to speak of giving "full weight"
to an offender's deprived background in every sentencing
decision. However, this is not to suggest, as the appellant's
submissions were apt to do, that an offender's deprived
background has the same (mitigatory) relevance for all of the
purposes of punishment. Giving weight to the conflicting
purposes of punishment is what makes the exercise of the






170. Id. 37 (internal citations omitted).
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extreme violence and alcohol abuse may explain the offender's
recourse to violence when frustrated such that the offender's
moral culpability for the inability to control that impulse may
be substantially reduced. However, the inability to control the
violent response to frustration may increase the importance of
protecting the community from the offender.171
A slightly different sentiment to that in Bugmy v The Queen
was expressed by the High Court in Munda v Western Australia.172
In Munda, the Aboriginal offender was originally sentenced to
imprisonment for five years and three months for the
manslaughter of his de facto spouse. On appeal this was increased
to seven years and nine months.73 The High Court rejected his
appeal against this sentence.7 In doing so, it stated:
53. Mitigating factors must be given appropriate
weight, but they must not be allowed 'to lead to the imposition
of a penalty which is disproportionate to the gravity of the
instant offence.' It would be contrary to the principle stated
by Brennan J in Neal to accept that Aboriginal offending is to
be viewed systemically as less serious than offending by
persons of other ethnicities. To accept that Aboriginal
offenders are in general less responsible for their actions than
other persons would be to deny Aboriginal people their full
measure of human dignity. It would be quite inconsistent with
the statement of principle in Neal to act upon a kind of racial
stereotyping which diminishes the dignity of individual
offenders by consigning them, by reason of their race and
place of residence, to a category of persons who are less
capable than others of decent behaviour. Further, it would be
wrong to accept that a victim of violence by an Aboriginal
offender is somehow less in need, or deserving, of such
protection and vindication as the criminal law can provide.
54. It may be argued that general deterrence has little
rational claim upon the sentencing discretion in relation to
crimes which are not premeditated. That argument has
special force where prolonged and widespread social
disadvantage has produced communities so demoralised or
alienated that it is unreasonable to expect the conduct of
individuals within those communities to be controlled by
rational calculation of the consequences of misconduct. In
such cases it may be said that heavy sentences are likely to be
of little utility in reducing the general incidence of crimes,
especially crimes of passion. That having been said, there are
three points to be made in response. First, the proper role of
the criminal law is not limited to the utilitarian value of
171. Id. 43-44 (internal citations omitted).
172. Munda v Western Australia [2013] HCA 38. This judgment was handed
down on the same day as Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCA 37.
173. Munda v Western Australia [2013] HCA 38 2.
174. Id. 4.
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general deterrence. The criminal law is more than a mode of
social engineering which operates by providing disincentives
directed to reducing unacceptably deviant behaviour within
the community. To view the criminal law exclusively, or even
principally, as a mechanism for the regulation of the risks of
deviant behaviour is to fail to recognise the long-standing
obligation of the state to vindicate the dignity of each victim of
violence, to express the community's disapproval of that
offending, and to afford such protection as can be afforded by
the state to the vulnerable against repetition of violence.
Further, one of the historical functions of the criminal law has
been to discourage victims and their friends and families from
resorting to self-help, and the consequent escalation of violentS 175
vendettas between members of the community.
The key theme of Munda is linking personal responsibility
with human dignity, suggesting that it demeans Aboriginals to
treat them as less culpable for their crimes. 17  This is empty
phraseology. The concept of dignity is too obscure to guide legal
standards and, to the extent that the ideal of dignity has some
merit, most people would prefer to give up some dignity for less
time in prison.177 Moreover, the outcome of Munda is at odds with
the recognition in Bugmy that disadvantage can impact upon
nurturing which, in turn, diminishes the embedding of
appropriate behavioural expectations and hence reduces criminal
responsibility.1 7 ' The relevance of social deprivation cannot be
negated on the basis that the circumstances of the offence or the
offender may point to a need to increase the sentence for reasons
of deterrence of community protection. In such instances, while
the sentence may need to be increased to achieve these other
objectives, logic demands that social disadvantage should still
operate to reduce the extent to which the sentence needs to be
increased to accommodate these other objectives.
These two judgments cannot be reconciled on the basis that
only in Bugmy was there evidence of relevant deprivation, given
that this is not relied upon by the High Court for contrasting the
judgments.1 79  While it is not easy to reconcile the judgments of
175. Id. 53-54 (internal citations omitted).
176. Id. 53.
177. Mirko Bagaric & James Allan, The Vacuous Concept of Dignity, 5 J.
HUMAN RTS. 257, 263 (2006) ("For dignity to provide meaningful guidance to
judges and lawmakers ... a number of matters need to [be] resolved, including the
meaning and justification of dignity.").
178. Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCA 37 12 (finding that appellant was raised
in an alcohol-abusive and violent home atmosphere, which later contributed to his
own criminal behaviour).
179. See, e.g., Munda v Western Australia [2013] HCA 38 3-4 (rejecting
appellant's argument that systematic deprivation and disadvantage should be
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Munda and Bugmy, it is clear that, at least in theory, entrenched
poverty is a mitigating factor in Australia, so long as the offender
can demonstrate an impoverished existence and that it is linked to
the crime in question. In reality, the weight that is given to
poverty as a mitigating factor is unclear. As a result of the
instinctive synthesis approach to sentencing, it is for the
sentencing judge to determine the weight to be accorded to this
consideration. The freedom to reduce a penalty by 1% to, say, 50%
at the whim of the sentencing judge potentially undermines the
significance or reality of this consideration.
Skepticism about the mitigating impact of poverty in
sentencing is supported by the grossly disproportionate
incarceration rate of the most disadvantaged group in Australia.
More acute studies build on this skepticism. A Victorian study
which compared the rate of imprisonment for both Indigenous and
non-Indigenous offenders confirmed that the former were more
likely to have a criminal record (84% of Indigenous offenders had a
prior conviction; compared to 75% for non-Indigenous offenders).180
However, even when allowing for this and other known sentencing
variables, Indigenous offenders were still more likely to be
imprisoned.181 The reason for these findings is unclear. There are
perhaps three possible explanations: (i) the researchers did not
eliminate all variables that impacted the sentence; (ii) actual bias
by judges and magistrates; or (iii) subconscious bias by
magistrates and judges. These explanations could operate
individually or cumulatively. Given the nature of the study, it is
not possible to ascertain which explanation is the most plausible.
However, taken at face value, the results are suggestive of
harsher, rather than more lenient, treatment of Indigenous
offenders."12
taken into account by the court when determining sentencing).
180. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 82, at 6 (stating that the same
overall trend exists in the United States).
181. VICTORIAN SENTENCING ADVISORY COUNCIL, COMPARING SENTENCING
OUTCOMES FOR KOORI AND NON-KOORI ADULT OFFENDERS IN THE
MAGISTRATES' COURT OF VICTORIA (2013) (detailing how Indigenous
imprisonment and detention have increased over time) [hereinafter VICTORIAN
ADVISORY COUNCIL]. Similar findings have been made in the United States
regarding African Americans and Latinos. See Cassia C. Spohn, Thirty Years of
Sentencing Reform: The Quest for a Racially Neutral Sentencing Process, in
POLICIES, PROCESSES, AND DECISIONS OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 427, 429
(Julie Horney et al. eds., 2000).
182. VICTORIAN ADVISORY COUNCIL, supra note 181, at 19 (discussing
common law principles to be applied by the court in sentencing Aboriginal
offenders).
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IV. Reform Proposals
A. The Concept of Mitigation in Sentencing-An
Overarching Perspective
I now consider whether, doctrinally, poverty should be a
mitigating factor in sentencing.183 To this end an important
consideration is the nature of mitigation. There is no established
or accepted theory of what should constitute a mitigating
sentencing consideration."' Courts and legislatures have
articulated mitigating factors but they have not been developed
with reference to an overarching theory or justification. Some
insight into the nature of mitigating in the context of sentencing
can be derived from types of considerations that mitigate penalty.
As noted above, Australian sentencing courts have a large degree
of discretion, which has led to a proliferation of mitigating
factors.8 They can be divided into four categories. The first are
those relating to the offender's response to a charge and include
pleading guilty, 7 co-operating with law enforcement authorities,18
and remorse. 9  The second are factors that relate to the
circumstances of the offence and which contribute to, and to some
extent explain, the offending. These include mental impairment,
183. It is noteworthy that while there is a considerable degree of literature on
whether poverty should be a criminal defence, there has been far less consideration
on whether poverty should be a mitigating factor in sentencing. A proponent of
poverty being a mitigating factor is William Heffernan. See William C. Heffernan,
Social Justice/Criminal Justice, in FROM SOCIAL JUSTICE TO CRIMINAL JUSTICE
47, 72 (William C. Heffernan & John Kleinig eds., 2000). However, Heffernan
believes that, in such a case, the effect of mitigation is not to reduce sentence
length but sentence severity, by providing greater job skills to these offenders and
by training them to accept responsibility for their crimes. See also Philip Pettit,
Indigence and Sentencing in Republican Theory, in FROM SOCIAL JUSTICE TO
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 230, 230 (William C. Heffernan & John Kleinig eds., 2000)
(arguing for a poverty sentencing discount; however, this is in the context of the
republican theory of politics and freedom).
184. EDNEY & BAGARIC, supra note 146, at 202 (discussing that while numerous
mitigating factors are set out in sentencing statutes or are derived from common
law, "there has been little attempt to link most of the factors to empirically
validated objectives of sentencing or normative principles that should inform the
sentencing task").
185. Id.
186. See SHAPLAND, supra note 147, at 55; LA TROBE UNIV., supra note 157.
187. See Cameron v The Queen (2002) 209 CLR 339, 350.
188. See TXT v Western Australia [2012] WASCA 28 28; R v El Hani [2004]
NSWCCA 162 66 (Howie J); R v Cartwright (1989) 17 NSWLR 243, 252 (Hunt J
& Badgery-Parker J).
189. See Barbaro v The Queen [2012] VSCA 288 38; Phillips v The Queen
[2012] VSCA 140 102; R v Whyte (2004) 7 VR 397 22.
190. See Muldrock v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 120 54; R v Verdins (2007) 16
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duress,"' and provocation."' The third category are matters
personal to the offender, which include youth, 3 previous good
character, old age,9 and good prospects of rehabilitation. 96 The
impact of the sanction is the fourth broad type of mitigating factor
and includes considerations such as onerous prison conditions,197
poor health,98 and public opprobrium.9
Mitigation has a lesser role to play in sentencing in the
United States, largely as result of the prevalence of mandatory or
presumptive sentencing."' However, to the extent that it impacts
sentences, similar considerations apply to those which exist in
Australia. By way of illustration, the range of mitigating factors
set out in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines for determining
whether a death sentence is appropriate, include:
(1) Impaired capacity - The defendant's capacity to
appreciate the wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct or to
conform conduct to the requirements of law was significantly
impaired, regardless of whether the capacity was so impaired
as to constitute a defense to the charge.
(2) Duress - The defendant was under unusual and
substantial duress, regardless of whether the duress was of
such a degree as to constitute a defense to the charge.
(3) Minor participation - The defendant is punishable as a
principal in the offense, which was committed by another, but
the defendant's participation was relatively minor, regardless
of whether the participation was so minor as to constitute a
defense to the charge.
(4) Equally culpable defendants - Another defendant or
defendants, equally culpable in the crime, will not be punished
by death.
VR 269, 272; R v Tsiaras (1996) 1 VR 398, 400.
191. Tiknius v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 215 32.
192. Va v The Queen [2011] VSCA 426 35.
193. R v Kuzmanovski, Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) [2012] QCA 19 16; R v
Neilson [2011] QCA 369 27.
194. Although it has limited weight in relation to white-collar offenders, see R v
Coukoulis (2003) 7 VR 45 59.
195. R v RLP [2009] VSCA 271 32; Gulyas v Western Australia (2007) 178 A
Crim R 539, 546-47.
196. R v Skilbeck [2010] SASCFC 35 34 (stating that fair sentencing "requires
weight to be given to the progress of his or her rehabilitation"); Elyard v The Queen
[2006] NSWCCA 43 18; R v Osenkowski (1982) 30 SASR 212 (Cox J).
197. Tognolini v The Queen [2012] VSCA 311 31-32; Western Australia v
O'Kane [2011] WASCA 24 68.
198. In AWP v The Queen [2012] VSCA 41 12; Dosen v The Queen [2010]
NSWCCA 283 26; R v Puc [2008] VSCA 159 32 (discussing how imprisonment
could cause significant adverse effects on one's mental health).
199. Ryan v The Queen (2001) 206 CLR 267 52-55.
200. See supra Part III.
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(5) No prior criminal record - The defendant did not have a
significant prior history of other criminal conduct.
(6) Disturbance - The defendant committed the offense under
severe mental or emotional disturbance.
(7) Victim's consent - The victim consented to the criminal
conduct that resulted in the victim's death.
(8) Other factors - Other factors in the defendant's
background, record, or character or any other circumstance of
the offense that mitigate against imposition of the death
sentence.0 1
The last 'catch all' consideration is reflected in a number of other
statutes.2 2 As noted above, the United States Supreme Court has
recognised the importance of mitigation in capital cases. However,
it has not developed an overarching theory of mitigation, and the
concept is generally applied in a broad manner .0  For example, in
Penry v. Lynaugh, Justice O'Connor stated that mitigating factors
are considerations which reduce the culpability of a defendant.
2 4
By way of further illustration, the range of mitigating factors
set out in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines include:
* minimal participant in any criminal activity
* acceptance of responsibility, as demonstrated by:
(A) truthfully admitting the conduct comprising the
offense(s) of conviction...
(B) voluntary termination or withdrawal from criminal
conduct or associations;
(C) voluntary payment of restitution prior to adjudication of
guilt;
(D) voluntary surrender to authorities promptly after
commission of the offense;
(E) voluntary assistance to authorities in the recovery of
the fruits and instrumentalities of the offense;
(F) voluntary resignation from the office or position held
during the commission of the offense;
(G) post-offense rehabilitative efforts (e.g., counseling or
201. 18 U.S.C. § 3592 (2006).
202. For example, in Arizona, mitigation in capital cases is defined as "any
aspect of the defendant's character, propensities or record and any of the
circumstances of the offense." ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-751(G) (2012).
203. This is reflected in California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 544-46 (1987)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
204. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 347-48 (1989), abrogated by Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); see also Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978)
("But a statute that prevents the sentencer in all capital cases from giving
independent mitigating weight to aspects of the defendant's character and record
and to circumstances of the offense proffered in mitigation creates the risk that the





(H) the timeliness of the defendant's conduct in manifesting
the acceptance of responsibility.
Mental and emotional conditions...
However, Section 5H1.10 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
expressly states that "Race, Sex, National Origin, Creed, Religion,
and Socio-Economic Status" are not "relevant in the determination
of a sentence."" Thus, poverty is expressly negated as a
mitigating factor." 7
Thus, there is little doctrinal guidance regarding the concept
of mitigation. This applies in relation to analysis in court
judgments and also scholarly works. In relation to the latter, for
example, Hyman Gross has noted that:
It is no easy matter to decide what shall count as a good
reason in mitigation of sentence once the relatively certain
elements of culpability have been weighed and more general
moral or prudential considerations are taken up. Because we
are civilized ... our moral life includes many different sorts of
things, and in meting out punishment for crime we need to go
beyond the simple justice of desert and show respect as well
for other things of value. In the first place there are
sometimes larger considerations of justice whose influence
makes itself felt. In fairness to him, what a man has done
that rebounds to his credit ought sometimes to be admitted to
counterbalance the crime that now rebounds to his discredit.
The acts of a good citizen and even of a virtuous human being
often have a proper place and count in his favour in deciding
on his sentence. Still, not every kind of creditable activity is
properly taken into consideration, and we find it difficult to
decide where to draw the line. Apart from justice, there is
mercy .... Sometimes compassion is not a matter of mercy
but a matter of right. When suffering would be cruel, the
sentence must be mitigated to prevent that .... Finally, there
are reasons of expediency that seem to warrant mitigation.
We wish to encourage those apprehended to cooperate in
bringing others to justice, and so we reward their cooperation
with lighter sentences than they would otherwise receive.
While this analysis is broad enough to encompass the
mitigatory factors set out above, reliance on broad and obscure
concepts as "fairness," "virtue," "mercy," and "justice" does not
assist in distinguishing considerations which are genuinely
mitigatory from those which are not. Ideally, analysis of whether
a consideration should be mitigatory should be in the form of a
205. FED. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 3B1.2, 3E1.1, 5H1.3 (2011).
206. Id. § 5H1.10.
207. Id.
208. HYMAN GROSS, A THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 451-52 (1979).
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top-down approach, grounded in an overarching theory which
explains and justifies the concept. However, this logical process is
not available in this context. This is because the large number of
mitigatory factors and, more importantly, the groups within which
they sit, have fundamentally different doctrinal and normative
rationales. A unifying theory of mitigation does not exist.2 9  As
noted above, it is established that mitigation may be justified for a
number of different reasons, including expediency and efficiency
(e.g., if an offender assists authorities to apprehend other
offenders), reduced culpability, or where the punishment has a
heavier burden on the offender.2" A fullsome theory of mitigation
would also require an examination of aggravating factors and take
into account perspectives stemming from (i) the sentencing
system, including the proportionality principle, (ii) the criminal
justice system, and (iii) the wider well-established principles of
justice.
Yet, it is tenable within each category of mitigation to invoke
broader principles to ascertain the appropriateness of a particular
consideration as a basis for reducing criminal punishment. The
broadest category of mitigatory factors relates to the circumstance
of the offence. The breadth of these factors stems from the almost
infinite number of ways in which a crime can be committed and
the vast diversity of human nature. No offences are identical, and
hence there is often a need to moderate sentencing to
accommodate relevant differences. To this end, as noted by the
U.S. Supreme Court, a key inquiry is the extent of
blameworthiness of the offender. 11 Culpability can relate to an
offender's particular mental state (e.g., where the act was
intentional or reckless), the offender's involvement in the crime,
and the offender's reason and motivation for the offence.1  In
order for poverty to mitigate, it can only link into the last
subcategory.
209. For an attempt to develop such a theory, see Mirko Bagaric, A Rational
Theory of Mitigation and Aggravation in Sentencing: Why Less Is More When It
Comes to Punishing Criminals, 62 BUFF. L. REV. (forthcoming Jan. 2015).
210. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3592 (2006); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-751(E) (2012);
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 309 (1989); GUIDELINES I, supra note 113, at §§
3B1.2, 3E1.1, 5H1.3.
211. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 602 (1978).
212. See id. at 613 (Blackmunn, J., concurring) (opining that the state was
incorrect in assigning culpability to the defendant without assessing her mens rea
and involvement in the crime); see also Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469
(2012) (introducing the defendant's "pathological background" as the contributing
reason behind his commission of the crime).
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In determining culpability, there is a significant overlap
between the substantive criminal law and sentencing law.213 In
general, the substantive criminal law draws strict lines relating to
the applicability of defences.214 Key excuses which can exculpate
otherwise criminal acts include duress, necessity, accident, and
insanity."' The criteria for legal excuses are necessarily narrow
due to the binary nature of criminal law, that is, defendants are
either guilty or innocent and, if the latter, they are beyond the
bounds of legal censure of punishment. However, sentencing is
not so clear-cut, and there is scope for degrees of blame and
wrongdoing that can be accommodated by adjusting the level of
punishment.
Thus, circumstances that are similar to those which could
attract a legal defence, but marginally fall short, should at least
potentially constitute mitigating considerations. This approach
has the additional advantage of injecting a degree of coherency
throughout the criminal law system.
Thus, a justification for allowing poverty as a mitigating
factor can be developed if it coheres with established and
justifiable legal excuses. As we saw earlier, Judge Bazelon, in
United States v. Alexander, stated that the impact of poverty can
be akin to a mental illness. 16 This analogy has not been developed
or adopted by other courts or commentators, and for good reason.
There is no evidence that poverty directly affects cognition or
understanding.17 Yet, there are two other defences that could
tenably extend to defendants who are impoverished. They are
necessity and duress. 18
213. See, e.g., The Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 5: (1)(a), (2)(c), (2)(d) (providing
that just sentencing law takes into account determinations typically governed by
criminal law-the gravity of the offence and the offender's culpability and degree of
responsibility).
214. For examples of strict liability crimes where defences do not usually apply,
see TEN, supra note 13, at 86.
215. For a discussion regarding the justification of criminal excuses, see id. at
86-122.
216. United States v. Alexander, 471 F.2d 923, 959 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ("But,
counsel argued, the expert testimony showed that at the critical moment Murdock
did not have control of his conduct, and the reason for that lack of control was a
deepseated emotional disorder that was rooted in his 'rotten social
background.'... I think his proposal was ingenious ... ").
217. For an analysis of the insanity defence, see Stanley Yeo, The Insanity
Defence in the Criminal Laws of the Commonwealth of Nations, SING. J. LEGAL
STUD. 241 (2008); see also Morse I, supra note 78, at 149-51.
218. See also Gilman, supra note 2, at 507-09. In addition to this, the social
forfeit theory proposes that coercion stemming from economic hardship is so
pressing that poor offenders have no realistic choice other than to commit crime
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Both of these defences have discrete elements that need to be
satisfied in order to excuse what is otherwise criminal
behaviour. 2" The exact content of these defences varies slightly
across jurisdictions. However, the differences are irrelevant for
the purposes of this discussion, given that any argument for
extending a legal excuse to a mitigating sentencing consideration
is necessarily based on the fact that elements of the defence have
not been fully satisfied. Instead, what is relevant for this
discussion is the extent to which impoverished defendants find
themselves in situations which are similar to those which attract
the defences of necessity or duress, both of which revolve around
an absence of true choice. The defences assume that the cause of
the criminal act is not the defendant's autonomous decision, but
rather the exigencies of the desperate situation.21 As noted
earlier, at the sentencing stage the deprivation of choice stemming
from an external factor does not need to be so profound as to be
causative of the action.2
There is no question that poverty limits choices.22 3 Resources
confer freedom. However, "freedom" is a relative concept-no
action is fully free. 24 The important inquiry is the extent to which
and, accordingly, that society loses its moral authority to punish poor offenders.
The account focuses on the impact of current deprivation, as opposed to previous
poverty, which is the focus of the insanity defence. Gilman suggests that both the
insanity and social forfeit theories have been used to ground a deprivation defence
in the context of child neglect matters in at least seven states in the United States.
Id. at 499-500.
219. For a discussion of the elements of necessity and its divergence in some
United States jurisdictions, see Stephen S. Schwartz, Is There a Common Law
Necessity Defense in Federal Criminal Law? 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1259 (2008). For a
discussion of the elements of duress, see Monu Bedi, Excusing Behavior:
Reclassifying the Federal Common Law Defenses of Duress and Necessity Relying
on the Victim's Role, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 575 (2011).
220. See Bedi, supra note 219; Schwartz, supra note 219.
221. In relation to necessity, the paradigm scenario in which it operates is when
a defendant commits a crime to avoid a greater harm occurring, which has been
caused by natural events-it is pressure of the situation that "forces" the defendant
to commit a crime. The classic statement of the necessity defence derives from R v.
Dudley [1884] 14 Q.B.D. 273 (Eng.). Duress, by contrast, occurs where a defendant
is forced by the threats and overwhelming pressure of another person to commit
the crime. See, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394 (1980).
222. Causation is one of the most important, yet ill-defined, principles of the law.
The seminal work on the topic is HART & HONORE, supra note 98. These issues
need not be addressed for the purposes of this Article.
223. See WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY,
THE UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 57 (2d ed. 2012) (discussing the limiting
effects of poverty on one's mobility, employment opportunities, education, and
social circles).
224. For a short summary on the varying theories on free will and action, see
Morse II, supra note 87, at 133.
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impoverished people have their choices limited and the degree to
which this inclines them towards crime. In relation to the first
issue, there is no mathematical measure that can be used to gauge
to what extent the poor have diminished opportunities. However,
it is incontestable not only that the poor have a limited sphere of
choice, but also that it can induce a degree of frustration.
Moreover, the poor are more inclined to commit crime than the
rich, because they do not have the same incentive to comply with
the law in order to maintain their own status. While there is a
sound argument that the poor are likely to be less prudent than
other individuals and have more incentive to break the rules than
the rich, it does not necessarily mean they are less blameworthy
when it comes to all forms of crime.
To the extent that poverty is limiting, it is understandable
that the disadvantaged might be more inclined to engage in
conduct that would expand their choices.225 Thus, the poor may
resort to economic-related crime to overcome poverty. This would
incline them to property and drug offences." However, serious
sexual and violent offences are not a means of overcoming
poverty."' Poor people committing such offences is, at best, a
demonstration of anger and frustration or an utterly derelict value
system. But "lashing out" has no place in a civilised community.
It could be that the poor "lashing out" is akin to acts committed
under provocation. However, this argument is untenable. First,
most victims of sexual and violent offences are totally blameless,
and it is not tenable to suggest that provocative conduct stems
from the operation of societal forces in general.28 Moreover,
225. See infra Part IV.B.
226. See Barbara Hudson, Punishing the Poor: Dilemmas of Justice and
Difference, in FROM SOCIAL JUSTICE TO CRIMINAL JUSTICE 189, 197 (William C.
Heffernan & John Kleinig eds., 2000) ("This reflects the fact that there is also
greater homogeneity of crimes at successive stages: more 'index offenses' such as
robbery, burglary, more drug crime, especially ghetto drugs such as crack
cocaine."); see also Morse II, supra note 87, at 141-42 ("A poor person threatened
with imminent death or starvation because he or she could not afford food or
medicine could justifiably take these items from another, conduct that would
otherwise be larceny ... ").
227. Support for this assertion can be inferred from data that shows sexual and
violent crimes to be widespread among the social classes. Hudson, supra note 226,
at 213 n.28 ("Victim surveys, self-report studies, and other criminological
investigations have established not only that the extent of these forms of behavior
is far more widespread than had previously been assumed, but that their incidence
is widely distributed among the social classes.").
228. See Luke Neal & Mirko Bagaric, Provocation: The Ongoing Subservience of
Principle to Tradition, 67 J. CRIM. L. 237, 242 (2003) (noting that in all
jurisdictions-with the exception of Tasmania and the United Kingdom-the
provocative conduct must have stemmed from the victim).
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provocation is decreasingly being recognised as a criminal defence,
and there are powerful arguments for suggesting that it has no
role in a justifiable criminal law system.9
Thus, on the basis of parallels with criminal defences,
disadvantage tenably should be a mitigating factor for property
and drug offences, but not for sexual and violent offences .2 " A
closer examination of the dichotomy between these offences
supports this view. It is to this issue that I now turn.
B. Sexual and Violent Offences
In relation to serious sexual and violent offences, empirical
data show that they have profoundly damaging impacts on the
victims. A number of studies have measured the impact of certain
crime offence categories on victims. The best information
available suggests that, typically, victims of crime suffer
considerably and, in fact, more than is manifest from the obvious
and direct effects of crime. The problem with some studies is that
they do not distinguish adequately between different types of
crime to determine the relative impact of specific and varied
criminal offences. However, the available data suggest that
victims of violent crime and sexual crime have their well-being
more significantly set back than for other types of crime.
Rochelle Hanson, Genelle Sawyer, Angela Begle, and Grace
Hubel reviewed the existing literature regarding the effects of
violent and sexual crimes on key quality of life indices.231  The
crimes examined included rape, sexual assault, aggravated
assault, and intimate partner violence. The key quality of life
indicia examined were: role function (i.e., capacity to perform in
the roles of parenting and intimate relationships and to function
in the social and occupational domains); reported levels of life
satisfaction and well-being; and social-material conditions (i.e.,
physical and mental health conditions). The report
demonstrated that many victims suffered considerably across a
229. See id. at 248-56. It is, however, a mitigating factor for sentencing in some
jurisdictions. See, e.g., Tyne v Tasmania (2005) 15 A Crim R 208 (Austl.); R v Kelly
[2000] VSCA 164 (Austl.); GUIDELINES I, supra note 113, at §§ 3E1.I, 5K2.10.
230. See also Gilman, supra note 2, at 505 (quoting Robinson, supra note 87, at
59 ("[Tlhere is little empirical support for the proposition that a generally
impoverished upbringing can itself cause a specific crime so as to render the
offender blameless.")).
231. Rochelle F. Hanson et al., The Impact of Crime Victimization on Quality of
Life, 23 J. TRAUMATIC STRESS 189, 189 (2010).
232. Id.
233. Id. at 190.
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range of well-being indicia, well after the physical signs had
passed.234 The report concluded:
In sum, findings from the well-established literature on
general trauma and the emerging research on crime
victimization indicate significant functional impact on the
quality of life for victims. However, more research is necessary
to understand the mechanisms of these relationships and
differences among tes of crime victimization, gender, and
racial/ethnic groups.
Findings showed that victims of violent crime, and sexual crime in
particular, have:
* Difficulty in being involved in intimate relationships and
far higher divorce rates;
23
6
e Diminished parenting skills (although this finding was not
universal);
237
* Lower levels of success in the employment setting
(especially in relation to victims who had been abused by their
partners) and much higher levels of unemployment;
23
1
0 Considerable impairment and dysfunction in social and
leisure activities, with many victims retreating from
conventional social supports;239 and
* High levels of direct medical costs associated with violent
241
crime (over $24,353 for an assault requiring hospitalization).
A study published in 2006, focusing on victims in the United
Kingdom, found that:
• Victims of violent crime were 2.6 times as likely as non-
victims to suffer from depression and 1.8 times as likely to
exhibit hostile behaviour five years after the original
offence; and
e For 52% of women who have been seriously sexually
assaulted in their lives, their experience led to depression or
other emotional problems, and for one in twenty it led to
attempted suicide (64,000 women living in England and Wales
today have tried to kill themselves following a serious sexual
assault).242
Chester L. Britt, in a study examining the effects of either
violent or property crime on the health of 2430 respondents,
234. Id. at 190-94.
235. Id. at 194-95.
236. Id. at 190-91.
237. Id. at 190.
238. Id. at 191.
239. Id. at 191-92.
240. Id. at 193.
241. MIKE DIXON ET AL., CRIMESHARE: THE UNEQUAL IMPACT OF CRIME 25
(2006).
242. Id. at 17.
[Vol. 33: 1
RICH OFFENDER, POOR OFFENDER
noted, "Victims of violent crime reported lower levels of perceived
health and physical well being, controlling for measures of injury
and for sociodemographic characteristics., 243 These findings were
not confined to violent crime. Victims of property crime also
reported reduced levels of perceived well-being, but it was less
244profound than in the case of violent crime.
Thus, it is clear that serious sexual and violent offences often
devastate the lives of victims, providing a powerful argument for
the imposition of stern punishment in response to these offences.
245
Of course, it does not mean that mitigating factors cannot
necessarily apply in relation to such behaviour.
However, disadvantage should not be one such consideration.
Even without familiarity with this data, all individuals are aware
that it is painful to be subjected to a serious assault and that
sexual integrity is important. 24' Rich or poor, all rational people
know that it is wrong to strike another person or to sexually coerce
them.247
As noted above, poor people are themselves more likely to be
victims of sexual and violent offences, which potentially
normalises such conduct. 248 This unfortunate narrative, however,
should not be a basis for providing a sentencing discount. It does
not militate against the fact that they are still aware of the
gravamen of such conduct, and are perhaps, in fact, more so given
the ruin that any victimisation would have had on their lives.
Simply, the damaging effects of these crimes and their
incontestable and palpably heinous intrinsic character permit no
room for mitigation based on the unfortunate background of
offenders. Thus, arguments in favour of a sentencing discount for
all disadvantaged offenders are too crude.
243. Chester L. Britt, Health Consequences of Criminal Victimization, 8 INT'L
REV. VICTIMOLOGY 63, 63 (2001).
244. Id. at 69-70. See also Adriaan J.M. Denkers & Frans Willem Winkel,
Crime Victims' Well-Being and Fear in a Prospective and Longitudinal Study, 5
INT'L REV. VICTIMOLOGY 141, 141 (1998). This is not necessarily inconsistent
with the findings noted earlier that financial resources cannot produce happiness.
Money and resources are relevant to well-being, but are not cardinal
considerations.
245. See Mirko Bagaric, Injecting Content into the Mirage that Is Proportionality
in Sentencing, 25 N.Z. U. L. Rev. 411, 438 (2013).
246. See Morse I, supra note 78; Morse II, supra note 87 (making a similar
observation regarding not making poverty a defence to crime).
247. See Green, supra note 21, at 63-64 (rejecting the view that poverty should
be a defence to such crime).
248. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STAT., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL




C. Less Serious Offences
In relation to less serious offences, there is a stronger
argument for mitigating the penalty of the disadvantaged
offender.249 This is true especially given that the level of damage
caused by these offences is often minor and the intrinsic
wrongness of such conduct is less manifest. As noted by W.J.
Wilson, for many people in poverty, crime is regarded as the only
option to rise beyond their station."'
Despite this, there are several arguments for not mitigating
harm even in these circumstances. The first is that, ultimately,
the principal reason for making certain conduct a crime is the
harm that it causes. 1 The reason underpinning the act or the
culpability of the offender are secondary considerations."
Criminal law is the domain where society inflicts its greatest
hardships on other members of society.5 Criminal sanctions
involve the deliberate infliction of pain on people.5 4 Sentencing is
the domain where "the state may use its most awesome power: the
power to use force against its citizens and others." ' A clear
justification is necessary for institutional pain infliction. This
justification stems largely from the carnage wreaked by crime.
Criminal acts are regarded as serious because of the bad
249. For a discussion of this proposal, see Hudson, supra note 226, at 189-216.
250. WILSON, supra note 223, at 276 ("In a context of limited opportunities for
self-actualization and success, some individuals in the community, most notably
young black males, devise alternative ways to gain respect ... ranging from simply
wearing brand-name clothing to have the 'right look' and talking the right way to
developing a predatory attitude toward neighbors.").
251. See Morse II, supra note 87, at 115 (arguing that the purpose of criminal
law is to condemn and blame, not to serve social welfare goals). Harm being the
principle reason for prohibition of certain conducts is assumed in Jan Gorecki's
argument for decriminalizing certain "victimless" acts (e.g., homosexuality). JAN
GORECKI, A THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 33-38 (1979) ("What is their common
characteristic? According to an often expressed view, they do not harm anyone:
nobody, at least nobody other than the criminal himself, suffers from them, but
they are prohibited and punished despite their harmlessness.").
252. The secondary priority given to the offender's circumstances in relation to
the primary consideration afforded to the actual crime and the harm produced by
the act is demonstrated in Munda v Western Australia [2013] HCA 38 (noting that
the offender's background and mitigating factors must be given "appropriate
weight," but the penalty should still reflect proportionality to the gravity and harm
of the offence).
253. Mirko Bagaric, The Punishment Should Fit the Crime-Not the Prior
Convictions of the Person That Committed the Crime: An Argument for Less Impact
Being Accorded to Previous Convictions in Sentencing, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 343,
345 (2014) [hereinafter Bagaric, The Punishment Should Fit the Crime].
254. Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, in PUNISHMENT AND
REHABILITATION 41 (Jeffrie G. Murphy ed., 1973).
255. Taslitz, supra note 86, at 81-82.
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consequences they cause: "The criminal law is designed to express
a political culture's highest level of condemnation for breach of its
most fundamental moral principles.2
However, there are degrees of harm and of diminution of
community safety caused by crime, and this variability provides a
tenable basis for the use of the offender's profile as a mitigating
factor in sentencing. Once the burden of victim suffering and
community safety is reduced, the scourge of poverty prevails in
balancing the competing considerations.
There are obviously some fine lines involved here. One
relates to the degree of impoverishment necessary to reduce
culpability; however, it is not an overwhelming consideration.
While social disadvantage is a matter of degree, and there is no
clear or even approximate level at which it so curtails free choice
as to incline a person towards crime, the nature of law is that it
must establish rules and principles which involve generalisations
about human conduct.25 '7  To make the law transparent and
workable, it is preferable that a presumption is established that
offenders who subsist in a state of poverty beyond a certain level
should receive a sentencing discount because of their relatively
lower level of culpability due to such poverty. The degree of
impoverishment that attracts this discount should be considerable
given the damaging effects of the crime and the importance of
sentencing-changes in this area should occur gradually and in a
measured manner.
I suggest that the discount should be conferred on offenders
who, at the time of the offence, live in poverty258 and have done so
for the majority of their lives.259  As noted above, this would apply
to less than 15% of the community. In order to attract the
discount, it should be necessary for a defendant to establish a
direct causal link between the crime and his or her disadvantage.
The exact explanation for human conduct is complex and multi-
faceted. It would undercut the application of the defence too
256. Id. at 81.
257. This is in order to operationalise the rule of law. See, e.g., FINNIS, supra
note 9, at 270-76; JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 211, 214-16 (1979);
Jeffrey Jowell, The Rule of Law Today, in THE CHANGING CONSTITUTION 3-23
(Jeffrey Jowell & Dawn Oliver eds., 2d ed. 1989).
258. According to the statistical definitions set out in Part II.
259. Transient poverty is not sufficient because many students are often
temporarily poor. Heffernan, supra note 183, at 71-72.
260. See supra Part I.B.
261. See JULIAN V ROBERTS, PUNISHING PERSISTENT OFFENDERS: EXPLORING
COMMUNITY AND OFFENDER PERSPECTIVES 193-202 (2008).
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drastically to require the defendant to prove that poverty caused
his or her offending in any particular case.2 2
The other important operational consideration is the
appropriate size of the discount. It needs to be large enough to
reflect the considerably lower culpability of impoverished
offenders but, at the same time, not so large that the penalty
would be grossly disproportionate to the seriousness of the crime.
In my opinion, a reduction in the order of 25% satisfies these
considerations. This is within the range of the typical penalty
reduction that offenders in Australia receive if they plead guilty to
an offence 23 and has not resulted in patently disproportionate
sanctions being imposed.2 4 At the same time, a 25% discount is
considerable enough to offer offenders a pragmatic incentive to
plead guilty, and hence it seems that it is a meaningful degree of
mitigation.
A potential disadvantage of this approach is that it will
reduce the deterrent impact of the criminal law so far as non-
violent and non-sexual offences are concerned in the context of
impoverished offenders. However, such a concern is misguided-
a penalty reduction on the basis of impoverishment would not
confer a licence on poor individuals to commit crime. The
empirical evidence shows that there is no link between heavier
penalties and crime reduction. To this end, there are two
general forms of deterrence: specific and general deterrence.6 6
262. But see Heffernan, supra note 183, at 72 (arguing that an impoverished
background itself should not be sufficient to be mitigating). Heffernan states,
"What is needed [to mitigate] are foreground factors that connect [poverty] to a
person's life: an abusive parent, for example, or victimization by a neighbor or
stranger." Id.
263. See, e.g., Phillips v The Queen [2012] VSCA 140, n.38 ("The extent of the
discount varies between jurisdictions. In NSW it appears to be in the order of 20-
25%; in WA, 30-35%; 25% in SA and 10-33% in NZ."); Cameron v The Queen (2002)
209 CLR 339, 340 (noting a typical sentence reduction of between 20% to 35% in
Western Australia). For examples of statutes mandating consideration of guilty
pleas in sentencing, see Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) s 22(1);
Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) s 13(3); Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988
(SA) ss 10B, 10C.
264. See, e.g., Phillips v The Queen [2012] VSCA 140 15, 26-27 (noting that
an 11.5% discount for a guilty plea in a case of a violent murder was an acceptable
derivation from the norm due to the severity of the crime).
265. Mirko Bagaric & Theo Alexander, (Marginal) General Deterrence Doesn't
Work-and What It Means for Sentencing, 35 CRIM. L.J. 269, 269 (2011)
[hereinafter Bagaric & Alexander, (Marginal) General Deterrence].
266. Mirko Bagaric & Theo Alexander, The Capacity of Criminal Sanctions to
Shape the Behaviour of Offenders: Specific Deterrence Doesn't Work, Rehabilitation
Might and the Implications for Sentencing, 36 CRIM. L.J. 159 (2012) [hereinafter
Bagaric & Alexander, Specific Deterrence].
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There are a large number of studies that have been undertaken
regarding the effectiveness of both of these forms of deterrence.2 7
It is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss them in detail. I
have recently overviewed and analysed this data, hence the
commentary below provides a summary of the relevant
conclusions.
"Specific deterrence aims to discourage crime by punishing
individual offenders for their transgressions, thereby convincing
them that crime does not pay. 26 8 In other words, "it attempts to
dissuade offenders from re-offending by inflicting an unpleasant
experience on them (normally imprisonment) which they will seek
to avoid in the future. '6  The available empirical data suggest
that specific deterrence does not work, so inflicting harsh
sanctions on individuals does not make them less likely to re-
offend in the future.2 7 1 "The level of certainty of this conclusion is
very high-so high, that specific deterrence should be abolished as
a sentencing consideration.2 7' 1  Thus, because imposing less
punishment does not affect the likelihood of any offender re-
offending, imposing less punishment on impoverished offenders for
certain forms of crime will not make recidivism more likely.
The other main form of deterrence is general deterrence, and
there are, in fact, two forms of general deterrence.27 2 "Marginal
general deterrence concerns the correlation between the severity of
the sanction and the prevalence of an offense.' 3 Absolute general
deterrence concerns the threshold question of whether there is any
connection between criminal sanctions, of whatever nature, and
the incidence of criminal conduct.27 4  The findings regarding
general deterrence are relatively settled. The existing data show
that, in the absence of the threat of punishment for criminal
conduct, the social fabric of society would readily dissipate; crime
would escalate and overwhelmingly frustrate the capacity of
267. For an overview, see Bagaric & Alexander, (Marginal) General Deterrence,
supra note 265; Bagaric & Alexander, Specific Deterrence, supra note 266.
268. Bagaric & Alexander, Specific Deterrence, supra note 266, at 159.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 161.
271. Id.
272. Bagaric & Alexander, (Marginal) General Deterrence, supra note 265, at
270.
273. Id.
274. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON J. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL
THREAT IN CRIME CONTROL 14 (1973).
275. For an overview of the literature, see DONALD RITCHIE, VICTORIAN




people to lead happy and fulfilled lives.276  Thus, general
deterrence works in the absolute sense: there is a connection
between criminal sanctions and criminal conduct.277 However,
there is insufficient evidence to support a direct correlation
between higher penalties and a reduction in the crime rate."8 It
follows that marginal deterrence (the theory that there is a direct
correlation between the severity of the sanction and the
prevalence of an offence) should be disregarded as a sentencing
objective, unless and until there is, at least, proof that it works.9
Accordingly, lowering penalties for disadvantaged offenders for
non-violent and non-sexual offences will not result in other people
being more likely to commit crime.
The empirical data is relatively clear. The argument that
reducing penalty severity in the case of disadvantaged offenders
will provide them with a licence to commit crime, while intuitively
appealing, is flawed.
V. The Need to Abolish Sentencing Practices That
Operate Unfairly Against Disadvantaged Offenders
While it is contestable whether disadvantage should be a
mitigating sentencing consideration,8 ' it is incontestable that it
should not be an aggravating factor."1 There are two ways in
which disadvantage can act to aggravate penalties. The first and
most obvious way is by the direct operation of a legal rule of
principle. This does not occur in the United States or Australian
systems of sentencing, and, in fact, it would be intolerable for any
system of law (in a jurisdiction governed by the rule of law) to
formally prescribe that disadvantaged offenders should be
penalised more severely than other offenders.
The second way in which poverty can aggravate is if a trait
which exists disproportionally among disadvantaged offenders
serves to increase penalties. This creates unfairness if there is no
justifiable reason for the aggravating effect of this characteristic.
276. See Bagaric & Alexander, (Marginal) General Deterrence, supra note 265, at
280-82.
277. See id.
278. Id. at 269.
279. See id.
280. See Heffernan, supra note 183, at 72.
281. This would be contrary to the proportionality principle: "[Tihe severity of
the sentence should be proportional to the seriousness of the crime for which the
sentence is imposed and to the offender's level of culpability." ROBERTS, supra note
261, at ix.
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To this end, there is one consideration that profoundly
operates disproportionally against disadvantaged offenders: that
the prior convictions of an offender are an aggravating sentencing
consideration. In fact, the prior criminal history of an offender is
the most important sentencing consideration, after offence
seriousness, in all common law countries 28 2 and can be so
significant that it means the difference between receiving a small
fine or many years in jail.283 The issue is pervasive given that most
offenders have at least one prior conviction 4  In the United
States, prior convictions aggravate heavily.2 5 As we saw in Part
III, it is most clearly evident from sentencing grids where prior
convictions always feature prominently and, generally, are the
most telling consideration, other than the offence type .
Punishing recidivists more harshly than first-time offenders is
intuitively appealing. Most people, including lawyers and
judges, share the view that repeat offenders deserve
additional punishment. There is, however, no settled
justification for this practice and, in particular, there is no
tenable theory which suggests that recidivists should be
punished considerably more severely than offenders without a
criminal history. Principally, the punishment should fit the
crime, not the antecedent actions of the person who committed
the crime.2 7
Recently, I have examined at length the appropriateness of
recidivist loading and have concluded that, as a general rule, there
is no justification for a sentencing loading based on recidivism.2 18
This is because the rationales underpinning the loading in the
form of general deterrence and specific deterrence are largely
unattainable281 and, hence, cannot justify a recidivist loading.
However, there is some evidence that serious sexual and violent
offences are disproportionately committed by offenders with prior
282. Julian V. Roberts, The Role of Criminal Record in the Sentencing Process,
22 CRIME & JUST. 303, 304 (1997) (discussing the role of prior convictions in
sentencing). The recidivist premium extends beyond the common law world to
countries such as Korea and Israel. See ROBERTS, supra note 261, at 16.
283. ROBERTS, supra note 261, at 1-4.
284. See Richard S. Frase, Prior- Conviction Sentencing Enhancements:
Rationales and Limits Based on Retributive and Utilitarian Proportionality
Principles and Social Equality Goals, in PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS, supra note 111,
at 117-36 [hereinafter Frase, Prior- Conviction Sentencing Enhancements]; Kevin
R. Reitz, The Illusion of Proportionality: Desert and Repeat Offenders, in PREVIOUS
CONVICTIONS, supra note 111, at 137-60.
285. ROBERTS, supra note 261, at 96.
286. See supra Part III.A.
287. Bagaric, The Punishment Should Fit the Crime, supra note 253, at 345-46.
288. Id. at 415.
289. See supra Part IV.
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convictions for these offences.9 This justifies a recidivist loading
for such offenders in the order of 20-50%, but only for such
offences.2 1 Moreover, the extent of the loading is not justified at
the level of the "super premiums" which are currently accorded.
Thus, the manner in which the loading currently operates is
unfair. This unfairness is compounded in relation to
disadvantaged offenders. Poor offenders are far more likely to
have prior convictions, and it is they who overwhelmingly bear the
brunt of the extra punishment that is meted out for previous
misdeeds. For example, an analysis of Californian correctional
statistics found a significant racial disparity in sentencing, with
African Americans being sent to prison more than thirteen times
as often as Whites.2 " Also, despite the fact that African Americans
comprise only 7% of California's population, they represent almost
half (43%) of third-strike inmates. 4 Similar figures come from
Washington, where African Americans account for about 13% of
the state's population, yet they represent about 40% of three-
strikes casualties.9
Thus, it is on the basis of the prior convictions that
disadvantaged offenders are often sentenced more severely.297 This
290. Bagaric, The Punishment Should Fit the Crime, supra note 253, at 416.
291. Id.
292. See Todd R. Clear, The Effects of High Imprisonment Rates on
Communities, 37 CRIME & JUST. 97 (2008); Frase, Prior- Conviction Sentencing
Enhancements, supra note 284, at 132; Brett E. Garland et al., Racial
Disproportionality in the American Prison Population: Using the Blumstein Method
to Address the Critical Race and Justice Issue of the 21' Century, 5 JUST. POL'Y J. 2
(2008) [hereinafter Garland et al., Racial Disproportionality].
293. Kelly McMurry, 'Three-Strikes' Laws Proving More Show Than Go, 33
TRIAL 12, 12 (1997) [hereinafter McMurry, Three Strikes]. This is even higher than
the normal gross over-representation of African Americans in United States
prisons. In 1991, they comprised 49% of the country's prison population, and only
6% of the general population. See MARC MAUER, AMERICANS BEHIND BARS: A
COMPARISON OF INTERNATIONAL RATES OF INCARCERATION 4 (1991).
294. See Garland et al., Racial Disproportionality, supra note 292; McMurry,
Three Strikes, supra note 293, at 12-13. More recent data reveal similar trends,
see Elsa Y. Chen, Impacts of "Three Strikes and You're Out" on Crime Trends in
California and Throughout the United States, 24 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 345
(2008).
295. McMurry, Three Strikes, supra note 293, at 13. However, the number of
people sentenced under three-strikes laws is significantly less in Washington
(seventy-one) than in California (more than 15,000 for second- or third-strike
offences). Id. at 12-13.
296. Id.
297. See also Elaine R. Jones, The Failure of the "Get Tough" Crime Policy, 20 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 803 (1995) (arguing that tougher penalties have not solved the
problem of violent crime); Nkechi Taifa, "Three-Strikes-and- You're- Out"
Mandatory Life Imprisonment for Third Time Felons, 20 U. DAYTON L. REV. 717
(1995) (arguing that three-strikes laws are against public policy).
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constitutes indirect discrimination and needs to be eliminated
from the sentencing inquiry. Attaching less weight to prior
convictions will not cure the ills that make it more likely that
offenders from deprived social backgrounds will commit crime;
however, the advantage of ignoring prior convictions is that it will
ensure that every time such offenders are sentenced, their
punishment will be no more than what is imposed on the affluent
offender who has committed the same crime. Disadvantaged
offenders will still appear in court more frequently than other
offenders, but, unless they have committed a serious sexual or
violent offence, their sentence would be determined on the basis of
the instant offence-not according to other factors. And even
when they have committed a serious sexual or violent offence, the
length of the sentence should, in general, be far less than is
currently the case.
VI. Limitations of Recommendations in this Article and
Priorities for Wider Social Reform
The recommendations in this Article, if they are adopted, will
not ameliorate all of the unfair burden experienced by
impoverished offenders. There have been a number of studies
which note the unfair treatment of the poor in the context of the
criminal justice system. Some of these findings provide
institutional reasons for the link between poverty and crime. For
example, in the United States, it has been noted that racial
minorities are stopped more while driving than White drivers. 2
8
Moreover, there is typically a greater police presence in poorer
areas 2 and some evidence of a higher number of arrests of racial
minorities, even when the commission of a particular crime (in
this case drug offences) is not meaningfully higher within that
300group.
Further, it has been observed that:
[I]nequitable access to resources can result in very different
outcomes between middle-class and low-income individuals
even though they may share similar behavioral problems ....
Once the decision is made to rely on the criminal justice
system as the primary response to social problems in low-
income, minority communities, the day-to-day actions of
criminal justice practitioners are constrained by that decision.
For example, police make more drug arrests in low-income
neighborhoods because those communities are not equipped
298. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 82, at 2.




with available alternatives for dealing with drug problems. 1
There is also some evidence that police and judges treat African
Americans more harshly than other individuals.3 "2 As noted in
Part III, there is also evidence suggesting that Indigenous
offenders are sentenced more heavily than similarly situated non-
Indigenous offenders in Australia."'
Thus, institutional biases seem to be part of the reason for
the disproportionate burden shouldered by the poor when it comes
to criminal sanctions. Nevertheless, the proposed sentencing
reduction would decrease the suffering imposed on the poor so far
as sentencing is concerned and could act as a catalyst for the
implementation of other concrete changes to the criminal justice
system, which would further reduce this burden.
Beyond that, it is clear that a more wide-ranging solution to
the problem of poverty and crime is necessary. My proposal deals
with the sharp end of the criminal justice system-sentencing.
Preferably, the underlying cause of the problem should be
remedied. Instinctively, the solution would seem to be to reduce
the gross income and resource disparity that exists between the
rich and poor. This is unlikely to happen. The gap in the United
States0 4 and Australia. is, in fact, widening.
It is generally beyond the useful realm of criminal justice
scholars to recommend wide-ranging social reform-certainly from
the perspective of the recommendations being readily adopted.
However, it may be useful to add to the reasons in support of an
existing recommendation.
The benefits of education are well understood and relate to
enhancing both individual and community prosperity. Less well
known are the advantages of education in terms of criminal justice
involvement. Education is, in fact, the single most important
variable that contributes to reducing the likelihood of
301. Id. at 6-7.
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304. Growing Apart, THE ECONOMIST (Sept. 21, 2013), available at
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imprisonment. A high school education, even for the most
disadvantaged section of the community, has a profound impact on
the likelihood of imprisonment, reducing the rate by over five-
fold.0 This figure is about ten-fold for a college education, as is
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Percentage of Men Aged Twenty to Thirty-Four in Prison or Jail, by
Race/Ethnicity and Education, 1980 and 2008
It follows that the single main policy initiative that
governments should undertake to reduce incarceration rates is to
make their children smarter. Prisons are expensive institutions to
run: it costs taxpayers in the United States, on average, $45,000
to house a prisoner for one year."' The total spending on prisons
306. See Bruce Western & Becky Pettit, Incarceration & Social Inequality,
DCEDALUS (2010), available at https://www.amacad.org/content/publications
/pubContent.aspx?d=808.
307. See id.
308. UNIV. OF S.F. SCH. OF LAW, supra note 107, at 18.
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is now over $50 billion annually. 9 By comparison, in Australia,
the imprisonment rate is 170 people per 100,000 adult
population;310 however, the cost of imprisonment in Australia is
nearly double that of the United States: $79,000 per prisoner per
year. 11 Social advantages aside, it would presumably be more
economical to invest more in education than to deal with the fall-
out in the prisons.
VII. Conclusion
There is no clear solution to what ought to be done to remedy
the problem associated with poverty and imprisonment. Given
that the underprivileged do not choose poverty, as well as the
difficulty associated with rising above impoverishment, there are
ostensibly strong reasons for treating disadvantaged offenders
more leniently. Disadvantage limits opportunity and choice and
often leads to rebellious behaviour.
However, doctrinally speaking, the sentencing system should
not always confer sentencing discounts to the poor. In relation to
serious sexual and violent offences, the devastating effect that
these offences often have on the lives of victims, plus the fact that
all people (no matter how poor) are aware of the heinous nature of
such crime, militates against a sentencing discount for these
offences.
The calculus is differently weighted regarding other forms of
offences, such as drug and property offences. Once the suffering
associated with violent and sexual injuries is removed from the
equation, the stricture and pain of poverty is paramount and
should be reflected in a 25% sentencing reduction for the poor who
commit such crime.
Moreover, poverty should not be an aggravating factor in
sentencing. Presently, this is the case because of the gross
sentence inflation that often stems from prior convictions. This is
a cause of considerable discrimination against the poor and needs
to be greatly curtailed, such that it only applies to sexual and
violent offenders and then only to escalate the penalty by 20% to
50%. This would considerably reduce the rate and duration of
prison terms imposed on the poor.
309. Id.
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Other than that, the main reform that needs to occur for the
poor in order for them to be less represented in the prison
population is that their education levels need to be improved.
Until that occurs, equal opportunity in all respects (including the
opportunity to avoid figuring so disproportionately in prison
statistics) will be diminished.

